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Abstract

In what follows, I highlight negative environmental perspectives and actions
based on traditional patterns of Western dualist thought with the ultimate aim of
developing an alternative way of relating to the environment and the ‘other’, in
general. In pursuit of such an alternative, I utilize embodied artistic practices in
order to present the notion that one can engage more holistically with one’s
environment, and the other. Through habitual, lifelong ‚Ways‛ cultivating
specific practices generally necessary to creating and to viewing art, I argue, one
can refine one’s ethical awareness and action. Following the aims of care ethics’
more context and experience-oriented approach to moral concern and to
treatment of the other, as well as the philosophies of Japan, and feminist
philosopher, Irigaray, I show how these artistic practices form a new awareness
and stance that encompasses components of care. Finally, I briefly highlight how
art has been used for positive activism.
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Embodied Ethics:
Transformation, Care, and Activism through Artistic Engagement
I. Introduction
Within the philosophies of several important thinkers in the Western
tradition, dualist thought has been a hallmark. In fact, the dualist mindset is a
pervasive one that has influenced Western thought profoundly. Dualisms have
engendered separation of the ‘other’ from those holding power as the dominant
class, as well as influenced the development of world perspectives in which
hierarchical relationships abound. Dualist philosophy has distinguished and
elevated rationalism, in the form of the ego-based, internal consciousness known
as ‘mind’, while the corporeal elements of an individual’s existence and of the
natural world have been conceptually divided by rationalism, as well as
accorded less value within society.
Devaluation of engaged interactions with one’s environment and
inattentiveness to or denigration of those traits and entities relegated to
‘otherness’ are negative outcomes emerging from this traditional system of
Western dualist thought in which transcending the world has long been
considered the ultimate way for humans to relate to it. Within contemporary
dualist paradigms, transcendence, rather than being a means of overcoming
worldly existence (through the classical concept of life after death, for example),

has taken the form of domination of the physical world through dualisms and
the traits that emerge from them, expanding their reach.
In my thesis, I explain how specific types of environmental justice issues
stem from this dualist foundation and its progeny, and represent foundational
problems that the new ethical paradigm I advance can help remedy By first
revealing various negative traits and actions that can be seen to represent a set of
dualistic and distancing perspectives and habits related to the environment, such
as colonization at the levels of microbiology, of land, and of culture, I work out
an account of ways of creating alternative perspectives and habits through the
model of bodily engagement and the creation of stronger intersubjective
connections.
The ethical model I develop is based on the view that creating and
strengthening intersubjective connections is a potent way to develop an ethical
relationship in which ‘care’ becomes implicit. By examining various ethical and
cultural writings on bodily, engaged artistic practices, I assert that a deeper,
more authentic understanding and nurturing of these connections can be a
powerful tool for living ethically, and improving environmental and other justice
issues so prevalent within our world.
The core of my argument is that artistic practices based on holistic
physical engagement produce a significant refinement in the inspiration and
2

forging of vitally connected ethical relationships. The corporeal and cognitive
links emerging from enduring habits of bodily action and interaction with
‘others’ are the keys to the self-cultivation needed to foster these ethical
relationships, and to enhance eudaimonia within an individual’s life, as well.
While my primary focus is on the transformation within the individual
artist practicing such bodily engagement, I also assert that those truly engaged in
appreciating the works created by him or her will form similar dispositional and
habitual ways of being. Furthermore, groups of individuals who are
participating in embodied/artistic practices or appreciation can, and have
collaborated for social activism, and I will briefly highlight a few examples of
these activist movements. To recapitulate, while I assert that art is a unique
realm, and not everyone possesses the ability to function on the most gifted
artistic level, there are ways to integrate these inherently artistic practices into
more quotidian aspects of life. Such integration can produce a deeper, more
prevalent ethics of care through personal dispositions and habits and more
experiential educational paradigms.
In section II, to begin my project, I illustrate a general conception of the
ethical importance of fostering intersubjective connections within structures of
thought and action that have, so far, maintained implicit aspects of dualism.
Utilizing, first, an overview of the negative aspects of dualisms, and then, a short
3

example, I reveal some basic elements of dualisms and lay the foundation for
cultivating more beneficial alternative perspectives and habits. By sketching
some differing insights into dualisms through the work of Val Plumwood, John
Dewey, John Russon, and Vandana Shiva, who represent ecofeminist,
phenomenological, and pragmatist schools of thought that are all committed to
moving beyond dualist thinking, I attempt to plant the seeds of possible
alternative ways of relating ethically. Next, by focusing on various negative
environmental traits and actions and how they relate to various forms of power, I
try to expand the understanding of intersubjective relations. Moving through
notions of how to understand power in more constructive ways leads to the
theme of care within ethics and the way that elements of care function within
and contribute to ethical relationships.
In part III, with the ethics of care as a context and an aim of the ethical
practice I advance, I illustrate how different historical ethical paradigms situate
the process of ‘practice’ within them. Furthermore, I assert that utilizing specific
embodied artistic practices – including ‘seeing’, creative imagining or artistic
intuiting, playing and participating with and spontaneously relating to
embodied materials, and uniting the conscious and unconscious – transforms the
artist, and engenders a sense of openness and possibility to the other. In turn,
these practices lead to more caring relationship between entities generally
4

labeled as subject and object, including humans and the environment. Finally, I
assert that viewers who form sensitive habits of ‘seeing’, and attentiveness, to
artistic works will share in the transformative process begun by the artist. This
process often impacts a community, and engenders a social component in which
the audience and/or other artists, as individuals or groups, are emotionally
affected and creatively inspired to perform acts of positive activism.
II. The Importance of Connection in a Dualistic Society
As Val Plumwood explains in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature,
within the rationalist traditions of Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, and,
alternatively, within the Christian world, dualistic constructions polarize the
human and the non-human. This tradition incorporates both the natural
environment and animals/animal nature and results in the creation of two
distinct categories, ‚or orders of being in the world.‛ (Plumwood 1993, 70). To
illustrate dualisms stemming from this tradition, Plumwood points out the wellknown examples of ‚mind and body, humans and nature‛ (Plumwood 1993, 70).
Furthermore, she stresses the prevalence of the dualist perspective by explaining
that while similarity and continuity exist between humans and nature, Western
views generally have stressed discontinuity (Plumwood 1993, 71).
Elucidating these perceptions of natural/human continuity slightly
differently, in Art as Experience, pragmatist philosopher John Dewey points out
5

that while awe often surrounds the spheres of spirituality and the ‘‛ideal,‛’ by
contrast, ‘the term ‛matter‛ indicates devaluation, and the representation of
something requiring justification of its moral worth (Dewey 1934, 5). Dewey
challenges that view by asserting that humans actually possess ‚the same vital
needs‛ as non-human animals and that therefore, continuity exists at a primal
level between humans and the environment, because
man derives the means by which he breathes, moves, looks and list the
very brain with which he coordinates his senses and his movements, from
his animal forbears. . . [L]ife goes on in an environment; not merely in it
but because of it, through interaction with it.
(Dewey 1934, 12)
The perspectives behind historical conceptualizations of discontinuity, on the
other hand, locate human virtue in human differences from nature (Plumwood
1993, 71). Therefore, the traits of human value ‚exclude those aspects associated
with the body, sexuality, reproduction, affectivity, emotionality, the senses and
dependence on the natural world‛ because these traits are also representative of
nature and animals (Plumwood 1993, 71).
This view holds that reason is the significant trait that endows humans
with humanity and separates them from ‚the sphere of nature‛ (Plumwood 1993,
71). Plumwood utilizes a quote by William James, a pragmatist like Dewey, to
emphasize one of her major reasons for discussing such dualistic conceptions.
‚Discontinuity is obtained via an account of human identity and virtue
which eliminates overlap with the ‘animal within’, or polarizes this as not
6

truly part of the self or as belonging to a lower, baser ‘animal’ part of self.
The human species is thus defined out of nature, and nature is conceived
as so alien to humans that they can ‘establish no moral communion’ with
it (James 1896: 43).‛
(Plumwood 1993, 71)
The idea that humans ‚can ‘establish no moral communion’‛ with nature is one
of the main underlying reasons compelling Plumwood to write about dualisms,
as well as the reason that dualisms represent more than a mere method for
differentiating between species.
By writing of dualisms, she unpacks the basis, often unacknowledged, of
humans’ moral stance toward the non-human world, as well as toward various
elements of the human one that are deeply associated with nature. Clearly
describing dualisms, then, leads to the ability to see why many humans,
especially in the West, take a moral stance that denigrates nature, as well as to
the possibility of prescribing a more thoughtful, just, and mutually beneficial
position.
The Relationship of Environmental Justice to Engaged Ethics
Traits that work against Nature and Environmental Justice
While several environmental justice concerns, including conservation,
access to and utilization of resources, and ‚development,‛ appear to be general
practical concerns, on further reflection, it becomes clear that questions and
solutions related to them vary greatly depending on the particular perspective
underlying them. One could isolate several attitudes that are detrimental to the
7

environment. Often, these attitudes are rooted in a philosophical tradition, like
Cartesian dualism, and have become so entrenched in everyday life that they
remain unacknowledged as an influence on decision-making related to the
environment. Therefore, I highlight four features of world-orientations, often
unacknowledged, that produce profoundly devastating effects on the
environment. These perspectives often appear together, forming a destructive
stance toward the environment in general, and toward environmental justice
issues, as well.
The four elements – dualisms, reductionism, viewing/treating nature and
culture as discontinuous, and colonization – form or intensify these destructive
world orientations. Furthermore, because humans are often categorized in
hierarchies as ‘closer to’ or ‘further from’ nature, they too, suffer from the
structural injustices undergirded by these views.
Dualisms are relationships between two elements, or objects, based on
power. The dominant-subordinate interaction within a dualism is often
naturalized through the dualist relationship, entrenching a master/subordinate
relationship that comes to be seen as, merely, reality, and not an interpretation of
it. Reductionism is a way of oversimplifying a system, often a natural one, that
allows groups or individuals to interact with the elements of it in a manner that
discounts much of the overall diversity within it. Looking at the elements from a
8

narrow view, reductionism tends to value a system for a simple, underrepresentative group of traits within it, that are chosen by the dominant group or
individual, the master, to allow for maximal exploitation of it.
Viewing/treating nature and culture as discontinuous, separate elements,
parallels the dualist way of subordinating nature to culture. I emphasize and
distinguish this attitude from dualisms, however, due to its pervasiveness within
daily life, as well as for the way that it has traditionally led to denigration of
various aspects of the world—whether dubbed natural or human. Finally,
colonization, while sharing some of the elements of reductionism, is a more
active, conscious approach to relegating people and things to a lower level of
value, and, often, appropriating much of their resources as well.
In Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Val Plumwood unearths both
general and specific ways in which traditional philosophical and cultural
structures have steered and sometimes distorted questions relating to cultural
and environmental concerns within the global community. By unpacking
conceptual dualism, she demonstrates that underlying what seem like obvious
issues, such as environmental injustices and development issues, exist more
fundamental cultural constructs that most of humanity appears to take for
granted.
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Implicit Dualisms, Their Basic Structural Features
The term ‘dualism,’ though tending to generate fairly clear-cut
impressions, such as ‘difference’ or ‘dichotomy,’ is a much more loaded concept
than these ideas suggest (Plumwood 1993, 47). Throughout her book on
feminism and nature, Plumwood continually refines the definition of dualism to
include the nuanced way in which it affects relationships and social structures.
At its most basic, dualism is a logical, conceptual tool developed through a
historical process, used by dominant groups to create and to entrench a model of
power between two elements, what Plumwood calls the ‘master model’
(Plumwood 1993, 31). Though the components within the dualism may differ, it
is possible, and even likely, that they are not ‘naturally’ opposed to each other—
take reason and emotion as an example (Plumwood 1993, 51).
In order to illuminate the reason/emotion dualism, I turn to John Russon’s
writing from Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of
Everyday Life on the concept of mood in which he states that moods are not, as
generally considered, ‚of secondary significance‛ (Russon 2003, 43). Though
mood is not necessarily synonomous with emotion, it can be thought of as an
everpresent condition similar to emotion, what Heidegger would call a
fundamental attunement. Russon asserts that individuals’ ‚primary way of
knowing reality‛ is through mood, and that it is the basis for what he calls, the
10

‚more developed and reflective acts of knowing‛ (Russon 2003, 43). Moods,
according to Russon, are one’s ‚immediate sensitivity, the immediate way in
which. . .‛ someone experiences ‚the demands of objectivity‛ (Russon 2003, 44).
Russon quotes Heidegger’s interpretation of cognition and moods, in
which Heidegger states: ‘‛*T+he possibilities of disclosure belonging to cognition
fall far short of the primordial disclosure of moods in which Dasein is brought
before its being as the there,‛’ which Russon interprets as moods’ initial
unlocking of the world to the individual’s experience, the interface between
world and self (Russon 2003, 43, quoting Heidegger 1962). The self, this
suggests, is not conscious of its moods, and only perceives them through their
filtering of perception. Because moods are ‚not manifest as self-perception,‛
however, they are often dismissed, or when acknowledged, treated as separate
elements of experience (Russon 2003, 43-44). ‚*R+eflective life is itself one of the
developments of our moods‛ (Russon 2003, 43). Therefore, relating ‚to a
situation is always to be in some mood or other‛ (Russon 2003, 43). In terms of
reason and emotion specifically, furthermore, Russon states,
The mood required for rational discourse is a mood of calm, but also a
mood enthusiastic about pursuing the implications of various ideas and
so on. It is not tenable to distinguish some people as emotional from some
who are not, or some experiences as being emotional and some not.
(Russon 2003, 43-44)
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Mood, therefore, is an instance that effectively illustrates that the nature of
reason and emotion is non-dualistic, inseparable, and intertwined within the
individual.
Regarding art, and foregrounding what I will discuss in section III, John
Dewey states that ‘in ‚rationalistic‛ philosophies of art . . . a fixed separation of
sense and reason’ exists (Dewey 1934, 269). He asserts, however, that artworks
are ‚so obviously sensuous and yet contain*s+ such wealth of meaning,‛ that they
cancel out this separation, and constitute ‚an embodiment through sense of the
logical structure of the universe‛ (Dewey 1934, 269). The rationalistic theory
generally considers sense perception as a means of distorting the reality ‚behind
appearances,‛ however, by employing the materials of the senses in art,
imagination exists in sensual form while also suggesting ‚underlying ideal
truth*s+‛ (Dewey 1934, 269). This emphasis on the intrinsically intertwined
nature of the senses and the universal elements of life becomes a central concern
relating to intersubjectivity within the Japanese arts and Luce Irigaray’s ethics of
alterity as well, which I discuss in a later section.
Contrasting this sense of continuity, however, the practice of presenting
objects, people, or traits within a dualistic association, such as that of
reason/emotion, places entities in opposition to each other, as reason and
emotion typically are. The creation of a dualistic relationship, furthermore, is
12

often strategic, according to Plumwood, since dualisms go beyond the realm of
thought, or concept, encompassing practical effects and fulfilling justifications for
concrete forms of ‚domination and accumulation‛ (Plumwood 1993, 42).
Through this constructed opposition, one of the dualistic elements is
subordinated/inferiorized to the dominant/superior one and placed in a ‚sphere
of otherness,‛ the realm of the allegedly vast difference that dualisms convey,
from which there is no escaping.
The dominant, or master, denies and devalues its dependency on the
excluded other because the master presents the dualism as a natural relationship
(Plumwood 1993, 41, 47). As the product of history and evolution, dualisms
have accumulated over time and may be integrated into new cultural contexts
when traditional ones become obsolete (Plumwood 1993, 43). Within modern
U.S. politics, for instance, colonization and appropriation of Native American
lands, as effects of dualisms, have taken on new forms. While they still function
to devalue indigenous culture, the forms utilized now are more subtle and more
institutionalized than previous forms.
For example, laws, which may appear to help a particular group, may
distort an issue or be directed against those that they should affect positively.
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, makes it necessary for Native American
‚artists to prove their Native heritage‛ (Bird 1998, 27). The law not only protects
13

‚investors in Indian art rather than the interests of Native people,‛ it also divides
Native Americans over Native descent and identity issues (Bird 1998, 27).
Furthermore, since dualisms exist as a ‚set of interrelated and mutually
reinforcing‛ pairs that pervade Western culture, they tend to remain intact and
infuse their logic within the conceptual system as a whole, while precluding
change (Plumwood 1993, 42, 48).
The Aspects of Dualism
Plumwood introduces five features, or aspects, of dualisms: 1)
backgrounding (denial); 2) radical exclusion (hyperseparation); 3) incorporation
(relational definition); 4) instrumentalization (objectification); and 5)
homogenization or stereotyping. These elements may occur in various
combinations, but some, or all of them, are present when dualism exists.
Backgrounding is the master’s fear-based reaction to his/her need of the
slave/subordinate as a means of identity creation and of material provisioning
(Plumwood 1993, 48-49). Because ‚it is the slave who makes the master a
master,‛ the master denies the other’s contribution, often through a ‚hierarchy of
activities,‛ in which the necessity of the slave’s contribution is denied
(Plumwood 1993, 48-49).

For example, while traditionally the labor of women

in the ‘private sphere’ throughout the world provides a vital foundation for the
functioning of family, society, and ‘public sphere’ economics, it is often
14

unacknowledged or dismissed. Even though the health of individuals and
cultures, and much of the basis of economic activity is supported by many of
these activities—like the numerous hours that women in many countries must
walk to gather water used for various functions—those in the dominant position
ignore these contributions (Waring 2009, 166-67). As Marilyn Waring states
regarding policy and acknowledgement of women’s economic and labor
contributions: ‚if you are invisible as a producer in a nation’s economy, you are
invisible in the distribution of benefits (unless they label you a welfare ‘problem’
or ‘burden’)‛ (Waring 2009, 165).
Radical exclusion, one of the main indicators of dualism, is a form of
differentiation where the master perceives and presents the other as being within
a completely distinguishable and lower level of existence (Plumwood 1993, 49).
The master emphasizes differences and attempts to eliminate similarity
completely so that there is a clear delineation between it and the other
(Plumwood 1993, 49). Additionally, through this process, dominant groups can
explain different moral luck through the seemingly objective filter of individual
‘natures’, which leads to protection of privileged groups (Plumwood 1993, 49).
Plumwood thus emphasizes that practical dichotomies are genealogically prior
to the dualisms that they support and that come to be understood as
metaphysical truth.
15

Ultimately, domination comes to be seen as natural because ‚What is
actually a sociological point comes to be labeled as being biological, or
preferably, metaphysical (Memmi 1965: 71-2)‛ (Plumwood 1993, 51).
Categorization of people into masculine or feminine gender, or the association of
the feminine with nature, for example, has long been considered to be based
exclusively on objective qualities. However, gender difference is actually socially
constructed by connecting human materiality to mystified ‘symbolic nature’
(Salleh 2009, 9-10). Dualistic views of gender encompass constructed elements,
such as women’s ‘inherent’ closeness to nature and man’s universality, as if they
were objective designations, when really, they are means used to continue a cycle
of subordination for female and natural others (Salleh 2009, 10).
Incorporation is a way of defining/perceiving the other only as it relates to
and reflects the master’s characteristics, wants, and needs (Plumwood 1993, 52).
Because the models of power and society are constructed by the master, society
comes to value his/her traits, and consider the other’s as the expression of lack
(Plumwood 1993, 44). Through incorporation (and radical exclusion) the master
can create the appearance that the other lacks complete independence and
autonomy because the other opposes the essence of what makes the master
independent—whatever traits that the master establishes. However, even
though the master may have subjugated the other through its dualism, it does
16

not logically follow that the other is naturally inferior, or lacks the ability for
freedom and autonomy. It is actually the master who finds identity through the
devaluation of the other. That is, by categorizing the traits of the other as inferior
to its own, the master arbitrarily elevates whatever traits it possesses through the
denigrating of the opposing traits of those it dominates.
Instrumentalism is a powerful aspect of the dualistic structure. Taking the
master as the center of society and of moral judgment, instrumentalism, along
with incorporation, reduces the autonomy of the other in another way: it utilizes
the other as a mere means to ends defined by the master (Plumwood 1993, 53).
Like incorporation, instrumentalism further distances the other from the master
by regarding him/her as devoid of intrinsic value, and only as possessing value
as a resource (Plumwood 1993, 53).
Homogenization reinforces the other aspects of dualism by ignoring
diversity and distinctions within ‚inferior‛ groups concerning myriad features of
life, including language, culture, and social organization. This generalizing of
others and separating of self, carried out by the master, lead to the establishment
of a binary world order (Plumwood 1993, 53-54). Whatever group the master
colonizes loses both: continuity with other individuals (especially those in the
‘master’ group), as well as individuality—in other words, radical exclusion and
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homogenization complement one another strongly. As Marilyn Frye states in her
discussion of gender stereotyping and homogenization:
‚To make *domination+ seem natural, it will help if it seems to all
concerned that members of the two groups are very different from each
other, and this appearance is enhanced if it can be made to appear that
within each group, the members are very like one another.‛
(Plumwood 1993, 54)
Internal and External ‘Otherness’
Dualisms relegate the body and the emotions to the position of ‘otherness’
within the individual. Similarly, elements of the ‚external world‛: nature,
determined as human ‘others’, as animals, and as objects, fulfill the position of
the subordinate ‘other’ in the worldly realm beyond the individual. Dominant
patterns of Western thought categorize bodily activities as ‚mere‛ expressions of
nature and of emotion, possessing less value within a system that prizes pursuits
it deems purely rational.
‚Much of the development of modernity has involved encoding the
rationality and properties‛ of the ‘master subject’, what Plumwood dubs
‚Rational Economic Man,‛ into ‚apparently impersonal, bureaucratic
mechanisms and institutions‛ (Plumwood 2002, 32). This encoding, brands these
properties as impartial or objective and, hence, also as rational. (Plumwood
2002, 32). It follows that nature and bodily engagement, on the other hand, are
devalued by this system, seen as mindless, savage, and even ‘outside ‚civilized
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society‛ (Mies 1986: 75)’ (Plumwood 1993, 107). In fact, inherent in the Western
concept of mind is the view of the corporeal ‘other’ at minimum, as separate
from prized rationality, and often, with destructive consequences, as inferior.
Plumwood illustrates this perspective through what she calls the ‘Rational
Economy’, in which these dominant patterns of thought categorize as a positive
form of rationality, almost any human means of subduing and ordering nature to
human specifications (Plumwood 1993, 107, 193). This approach, like
instrumental rationality, utilizes reason to decide how to best achieve one’s ends
without actually reasoning about the value of the ends themselves. As one
analyzes dualistic thinking in more depth, however, it becomes apparent that the
‚rationalism‛ of actions that order nature based almost exclusively on various
human priorities, if taken to its logical conclusion, is actually irrational.
In the detailed discussion that follows, I analyze how dualisms and other
negative traits affect the environment. Their destructive mechanisms suggest
that actions generally considered ‘economically rational’ are actually irrational.
Ultimately, these traits and the actions they engender, if unchecked, inevitably
lead to the destruction of the human economy because they destroy the natural
resources necessary for its continued functioning. Even more importantly, these
behaviors reduce myriad positive elements – natural, social, and others – to
merely an economically based assessment of profitability.
19

Those in power, within this model, elevate themselves to a status that
naturalizes their power by distancing themselves from the devalued natural
world. Transcendence, in this sense, represents the function of domination and
of control of the world through those deemed ‘other’ in the pursuit of the
master’s own ends. By removing oneself conceptually from nature, dominant
groups utilize ‚the rationality of the monologue,‛ a mode of communication in
which only the conceptions of the dominant side are valued in what should be a
communicative discourse. This monologue, however, actually functions as a unidirectional mode of communication, devoid of interaction between subject and
object. The voice of the subordinate ‘other’ goes unheard, or at least, unheeded.
The dominant group finds value in the ‘other’ only in its capacity to provide for,
and define itself as master (Plumwood 2002, 19).
A Contemporary Scenario Regarding Distance and Dualism
As previously stated, the dualist paradigm affects thought and behavior
on several levels in an often ethically damaging manner. One simple example
that highlights how dualisms intensify negative effects within ethical
relationships emerges from the advancements in technology within
contemporary society. At this time in history, technology makes it possible to do
many things in many places without actually being ‚there,‛ not truly being
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present, nor actually engaging in the performance of the given activity, or doing
so without reflection or mindfulness.
With the advancement in computerized and mechanized machines that
facilitate lightly pressing a button to produce numerous outcomes, the very
mechanism of cause and effect, in some tangible sense, becomes obscured. This
situation often causes an individual to become or remain deficient in
understanding or intuiting whether he or she is using another in a negatively
dualistic way. Because whatever effect the individual desires can be carried out
somewhat automatically, he or she has little awareness of the negative outcome
of his or her actions.
The convenience of technology, therefore, diminishes one’s
understanding of the effects of his or her actions because of the distance between
the agent and the action and its effects. Furthermore, similar to the instrumental
type of rationalism at work in Plumwood’s ‚Rational Economy,‛ the use of
technology aids one in reaching one’s ends without deliberation about their
value. That is, by using a machine, for example, to weed a garden, one may
easily lose sight of whether the given results are even desirable because very
little thought is put into an activity that one is less connected to corporeally.
While many technological conveniences allow for superficial life improvements
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and more efficient means of producing their varied results, I question what such
changes in the way individuals act and interact mean for ethics?
In some instances, automating activities that were formerly done by hand
leads to habits that prevent deliberation about the ways in which the action
affects others. Take the example of gardening, specifically, weeding a garden.
An individual who is weeding by hand must observe and discriminate between
the types of plants that are growing in the attempt to keep a healthy balance
within the garden. It is helpful to relate this idea to Robert E. Carter’s statement,
in The Japanese Arts and Self-Cultivation, about leaving an everyday
environment in order to enter a garden. By physically being in a garden, ‚*o+ne
is not only in the garden, but now one is a part of the garden: not a visitor any
longer, but a participant‛ (Carter 2008, 54). When weeding, one pulls out those
weeds and plants considered to be extraneous, unhealthy for the ecosystem of
the specific type of garden and, in this way, is actually a part of the garden’s
functioning.
The bodily act of grasping and pulling out the weeds, knowing they will
die, may lend a sense of responsibility to the activity. On the other hand, if
someone uses a ‘weed-wacker’, he/she becomes less discriminating in
performing this endeavor since it is easy to alter a whole garden within minutes,
without a second thought. When weeding by hand, an individual is more likely
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to develop a personal sense of the patterns of growth within the garden. One
likely acquires an understanding of the weeds’ and plants’ resilience and lifeforce, and the garden—even the weeds—is seen as a dynamic natural system,
rather than an inert objectified space where a flick of the switch can allow one to
raze a mini-ecosystem for one’s own purposes alone. This leads to the ‚feeling of
kinship‛ with the elements in the garden, the knowledge that the self is
interconnected with them (Carter 2008, 69). The garden, though altered by
weeding, when done with deliberation and understanding, is not as likely to be
subordinated within a dualistic paradigm. It and its various components are
more likely to be given consideration in their own right, as more than means
reduced to the master’s/weeder’s ends.
Reductionism
‚Reducing organic wholes to fragmented, separable and substitutable parts has
been the reductionist method of going beyond nature’s limits‛ (Shiva 1993, 28).
Reductionism, as described by Vandana Shiva in her essay,
‚Reductionism and Regeneration: A Crisis in Science,‛ is based,
epistemologically and ontologically, on specific assumptions about the natural
world. These assumptions, according to Shiva, include ‚uniformity, perceiving
all systems as comprising the same basic constituents, discrete, and atomistic,
and assuming all basic processes to be mechanical‛ (Shiva 1993, 23). Under a
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reductionist paradigm girded by ‚the assumption of divisibility and
manipulability,‛ one views the natural world as ‚a machine‛ (Shiva 1993, 23).
Earlier historical ‘organic metaphors’, however, saw human groups as
considering power to be grounded ‚on interdependence and reciprocity‛ (Shiva
1993, 23). Within her essay, Shiva quotes Carolyn Merchant’s argument that the
reductionist versions of economy, technology, and science, have propagated a
mechanist view of reality, in which reality is viewed ‘‛as a machine, rather than a
living organism‛ (Merchant 1980)’ (Shiva 1993, 24). This view, furthermore, has,
Merchant states, ‘‚sanctioned the domination of both nature and women‛
(Merchant 1980)’ Shiva 1993, 24). I would add that these incarnations of
reductionism have also systematically devalued non-dominant forms of
knowledge (‘subjugated knowledges’), and non-dominant cultures and races, as
well, by discounting the value of knowing about those parts of the system seen
as unimportant to the master, like mechanisms of indigenous forestry and
farming practices (Shiva 1993, 24).
Shiva categorizes the domination of which Merchant speaks as ‚the
violation of integrity,‛ ‚inherently violent‛ (Shiva 1993, 24) and sees the
epistemological and ontological ‚assumptions of reductionism‛ as related to one
another. Uniformity and divisibility are key to the way that reductionism
functions. Uniformity, similar to Plumwood’s concept of homogenization, or
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stereotyping, sanctions seeing information relating to fragments within a system
as signifying an understanding ‚of the whole,‛ (Shiva 1993, 24). Though
elements may be different and serve different purposes, the aspects that the
master deems important define the whole, while the other parts are trivialized.
For instance, in the former example involving gardening and the distance
coming from the use of a weed-whacker, the garden serves a particular selfinterested purpose for the master/weeder at the expense of other aspects of the
its existence.
By using this distancing technology, the gardener comes to find certain
elements important to him/her, likely dismissing or ignoring many functions of
the garden that constitute an ecosystem in its own right. Divisibility, like
Plumwood’s radical exclusion, or hyperseparation, removes knowledge from its
context. Furthermore, divisibility makes some forms of knowledge that are
detached—unrelated to the context of the physical world—dominant, and
marginalizes the divided, ignored, or devalued contextual knowledge (Shiva
1993, 24). Shiva emphasizes that those who make a claim to ‘objectivity’, are
often mistaking it for what is actually a distorted theoretical, abstracted
knowledge, alien to context, and ‚based on . . . non-participation‛ (Shiva 1993,
24).
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Shiva assesses reductionism as the logical epistemological basis used to
efficiently serve the needs of a capitalist ‚economic and political organization‛
(Shiva 1993, 24). Her interpretation asserts that within the reductionist worldorientation, economic capitalism and ‚the industrial revolution‛ fulfill the
‚philosophical, technological and economic components of the same process,‛
that of improving efficiency. In this scenario a majority of corporations measure
efficiency as the maximization of profits with little to no consideration for the toll
on the ecological or social components of society (Shiva 1993, 24).
With this orientation as the basis for decisions regarding the environment,
with the valuing of only the profitable elements within ‚resource systems,‛ often
procured ‚through exploitation and extraction,‛ ecosystems are reduced to
single components with single functions. This leads to the destruction of those
natural (stabilizing ecological) processes that exist in their own right and do not
lead to profit (Shiva 1993, 24). Using the forest, Shiva provides a powerful
example of reductionism that is legitimized by science due to the increase of
overall productivity (Shiva 1993, 25). Here, reductionism truncates the
components of the forest ‚to commercial wood,‛ and reduces wood ‚to cellulose
fibre for the pulp and paper industry‛ (Shiva 1993, 25). Regardless of the
consequences to the forest as a whole, to its diversity and natural functions, the
increase in productivity trumps all other concerns.
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In this way, reductionist science is at the root of the growing ecological
crisis, because it entails a transformation of nature that destroys its
organic processes and rhythms and regenerative capacities.
(Shiva 1993, 25)
Within the reductionist structure, continuity with nature, relationships to
nature, and the various functions of natural processes are devalued while profits
are prized. The ecological processes of nature are instrumentalized and
backgrounded, their contributions to society discounted. Interactions with
nature may have value and productivity on many levels. However, if these
exchanges are less profitable economically than others, the monoculture profit
system erases them conceptually, totally ignoring their intrinsic, non-monetary
value. Here again, those who form a healthy interdependence within
relationships, often including those with nature, in what I will later introduce as
an intimacy-based world orientation, are discounted by those who possess a
distanced relationship and utilize a reductive approach to nature based on
profitability.
In her essay, ‚Immersed in Words,‛ Roberta J. Hill expresses a way of
relating with nature that is counter to that of reductionism. She states, ‚*a+ subtle
communion and communication sometimes take place between human beings
and other beings on the earth‛ (Hill 1998, 88). Her poem, ‚A Presence That
Found Me Again, Again‛ honors a wild plum tree, while illuminating how the
tree gave her ‚the energy to go on‛ throughout years of struggle through an
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‚emotional interaction taking place between the plum tree and me‛ (Hill 1998,
90). The second stanza reveals how humans can perceive and relate to nature in
a variety of ways including an empathic one.
Wild plum ripe as ever
along the river even then
you invited faith in feeling
offered me as sky when the sky gleamed
blue as my first mother’s milk
buoyed me over swamp and coulee
like notes of a long lost melody
When I gleaned grief
you another reaper shook your red
skirt in leafy shadows
(Hill 1998, 89)
This response to natural elements follows what Plumwood calls ‚the intentional
recognition stance,‛ a counter-hegemonic practice
of openness and recognition able to make us aware of agentic and
dialogical potentialities of earth others that are closed off to us in the
reductive model that strips intentional qualities from out of nature.
(Plumwood 2002, 177)
This stance opens ‚our perceptual possibilities‛ to forms of intentionality and
intelligence, such as ‚pheromone-based, sonar based and pollen-based
sensitivities and chemical communication systems‛ (Plumwood 2002, 177, 180).
Through it, Plumwood argues, modes of communication come to be recognized
as including much more than the modes used by humans (Plumwood 2002, 189190). Furthermore, she suggests that communicability, under this model,
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includes ‚places, experiences, processes, encounters, projects, virtues, situations,
methodologies and forms of life‛ (Plumwood 2002, 190).
Artistic practice can inspire these ‚dialogical modes of encounter‛ that aid
in the ultimate ability to treat others, including non-human animals and nature,
with a more caring ethical attitude that acknowledges them as ‚potentially
intentional and communicative being*s+ and narrative subject*s+‛ (Plumwood
2002, 190). Themes relevant to this mode of encounter, like ‚emotional
responsiveness‛ and ‚attunement to . . . particular contexts‛ are neglected
within ‚rationalist ethics,‛ however (Plumwood 2002, 187).
Alternatively, by utilizing a more feminist line of ethical concern, quoting
Margaret Walker, Plumwood asserts that,
‚This view does not imagine our moral understandings *as+ congealed
into a compact theoretical instrument of impersonal decision, [such as
rights or value] but as deployed in shared processes of discovery,
expression, interpretation, and adjustment between persons.‛
(Plumwood 2002, 187)
Though herself participating in such intense and dialogical experiences with
others in nature, Hill realizes that experiences such as those expressed through
her poem, often go unexpressed and unfulfilled. This, she believes, is due to the
West’s denial of non-human intelligence and worth (Hill 1998, 90).
[D]ominant values complicate honest emotional relationships between
human beings in order to insert a commodity mentality. . . The same
system also forces us to deny insights of believing in a universe at one
with a spiritual intelligence. In a culture where all beings can be sold and
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exchanged and made into objects of commerce, all beings are imagined to
be without consciousness. . . Even relationships between human beings
are devalued in order to sell things.
(Hill 1998, 90)
Reductionism, as a ‚mechanistic metaphor,‛ therefore, develops the
‚measure of value‛ as an almost exclusively monetary one (Shiva 1993, 25). The
valuation of a single uniform element of life, money, which is isolated at the
expense of a diversity of differing values aside from the fiscal is, in itself, a
reductive act. This way of measuring value, furthermore, develops the means of
destroying what the system deems valueless (Shiva 1993, 25). ‚It creates the
possibility of colonizing and controlling that which is free and self-generative‛
(Shiva 1993, 25). Under this rubric, those considered experts add value to the
‘raw’ material that ‚*n+ature, women and non-white people‛ provide (Shiva
1993, 25).
Take the example of the reduction of reproduction in plants through the
‚*c+olonization of the seed‛ (Shiva 1993, 28-29). Deeming the natural
regenerative cycles of nature as obstacles that slow down the ability to procure
profit, corporations have divided seeds into various types: those that produce
food, and those that become a commodity (Shiva 1993, 29). Those who colonize
seed by genetically engineering it, reduce its value merely to its ability to
produce profits for their companies.
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One of Shiva’s major points about the colonization of seed highlights the
irony of exploiting nature, as well as those human beings who function
interdependently with it. ‚Modern plant-breeding,‛ she states, is predominantly
a way to remove the ‚biological obstacle‛ in marketing seed, the ‚biological
obstacle‛ being the seed’s ‚inherent ability to regenerate and multiply‛ (Shiva
1993, 29). Seeds are engineered to yield more, but require a greater contribution
of external elements like water and fertilizer. The major key to profiting from
seed has become the development of strains that are unable to reproduce
themselves, and that cannot be saved and reused. No longer a common
resource, then, seeds become a commodity, and for those groups who had long
utilized them to live, Shiva adds, ‚an instrument of poverty and
underdevelopment‛ (Shiva 1993, 29).
Erosion of genetic material within the seeds, and deprivation of the ability
to utilize the formerly common resource by local farmers, are two distinct
outcomes of seed colonization (Shiva 1993, 30). By deliberately genetically
engineering seeds so that they no longer reproduce as they naturally did, those
seeking to reduce seed to profit, work to control its natural reproductive
function. In this way, they alter nature for their own shortsighted and personal
advantage. Ironically, the definitionally regenerative properties of ‘non-
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commoditized’ seed become subservient to technology and culture in order to
regenerate only when manipulated by them (Shiva 1993, 30).
Viewing Nature/Culture as Discontinuous
‚Now the categories of ‚nature‛ and ‚culture‛ are of course conceptual
categories—one can find no boundary out in the actual world between the two
states or realms of being‛ (Ortner 1974, 6).
While there is much scientific knowledge within such fields as
evolutionary biology mapping connections between human and non-human
nature, the view that nature and culture lack continuity is ‚deeply and fatally
entrenched‛ in the modern Western human/nature model in the form of the
radical exclusion dualism that emphasizes difference. (Plumwood 1993, 6).
Plumwood points out that many modern environmental scholars, such as David
Suzuki, advance the theme of continuity and interdependence between species as
necessary for ‚a healthy biosphere.‛ (Plumwood 1993, 6).
Much of modern society, however, as evidenced by its reductive values,
views the theme of continuity and interdependence as ‚revolutionary‛ due to the
long history of the human/nature dualism. This history has functioned in a way
that creates the illusion that domination of humans, as well as of non-humans, is
an effect of naturally occurring power relations, not to be questioned, in which
one group distances itself from another in an attempt to exclude the other and
place it in a subordinate sphere (Plumwood 1993, 6).
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When a dominant group treats nature and culture as dualistically related,
differences are emphasized and shared qualities are eliminated, or treated ‚as
inessential,‛ in order ‚to achieve maximum separation‛ (Plumwood 1993, 49).
For example, one way that those within a subordinated race or ethnicity are
labeled as very different from those in power and very similar to each other is by
lumping them together through racist stereotypical labeling—such as phrases
asserting that African Americans or Asians ‘all look alike’. As Sherry Ortner
states, in her essay ‚Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?‛ all cultures
tacitly recognize and assert ‚a distinction between the operation of nature and
the operation of culture (human consciousness and its products)‛ (Ortner 1974,
7). Culture, furthermore, distinguishes itself through its general ability to
‚transcend natural conditions and turn them to its purposes‛ (Ortner 1974, 7).
The ability to control nature—‘to ‚socialize‛ and ‚culturalize‛-nature’ –
therefore, has allowed human culture to use non-human nature, and those who
are associated with it, for its ends. This ability, ‚at some level of awareness,‛
leads human culture to perceive itself as more than simply different from nature.
Due to its capacity and desire to transform nature, humans, as the progenitors of
culture, actually view themselves as superior to it (Ortner 1974, 7). Viewing the
world from this long-held perspective of discontinuity promotes decision-
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making that disassociates culture from its deep connection with non-human
nature.
In contrast to this perspective of discontinuity, John Dewey, in Art as
Experience, again counters this dualistic separation of nature and culture, by
asserting that the endurance of civilization and culture ‚is evidence that human
hopes and purposes find a basis and support in nature‛ (Dewey 1934, 28).
Highlighting the individual human life-cycle ‚from embryo to maturity,‛ Dewey
labels culture as the product stemming from an organism’s ‚prolonged and
cumulative interaction with environment‛—its (natural) surroundings, rather
than the ‚efforts of men put forth in a void or just upon themselves‛ (Dewey
1934, 28). Dewey illustrates an additional idea that I will touch on in Section IV,
noting how
[t]he depth of the responses stirred by works of art shows their continuity
with the operations of this enduring experience. The works and the
responses they evoke are continuous with the very processes of living as
these are carried to unexpected happy fulfillment.
(Dewey 1934, 28)
All of the philosophy that attempts to reframe the relationship between
humans and nature, reinterprets Cartesian dualisms. The ‚post-Cartesian
project‛ related to acknowledging continuity between nature and culture, and to
developing intersubjectivity, is that of ‚rediscovering the ‘body in the mind’‛
(Plumwood 2002, 179). Through ideas such as ‚’speaking matter,’‛ introduced
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by Luce Irigaray and other feminist philosophers, this method attempts to locate
and develop a foundation for an understanding of ‚’continuity between mind
and nature’‛ that is non-reductive (Plumwood 2002, 179).
Those artists who work with the elements/elementals, such as earth artists
and architect/sculptor Maya Lin, and viewer responses to them, will provide
some examples of overcoming a negative sense of discontinuity. For instance,
Amanda Boetzkes, in The Ethics of Earth Art, asserts the view that earth artists
attempt to form an ethical relation with the earth that is neither instrumental, nor
naively Romantic in the sense that humans live in seamless continuity with it.
These artists create works based on bodily receptivity to the elemental qualities
of the world, rather than on representations that reduce the earth to purely
human meanings. In section III of my essay, I will explain how some of their
methods rely on and utilize concepts such as elementals and ‘speaking matter’.
Colonization
Colonization is the master’s attempt to naturalize a dualistic power
structure in order to exert control over a place, a people, or a resource or object.
Colonizers, according to Plumwood, utilize ‚*t+he rationalist ideology of reason‛
as a means of separating themselves from the colonized—radically excluding
them—and devaluing their traits. Once the dichotomy is established and a thing
is categorized as other, the master has a logical structure through which it can
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dominate (Plumwood 2002, 106). While dualisms, reductionism, and viewing
nature/culture as discontinuous are implicit attitudes that often lead to
corresponding actions with negative ethical effects for ‘others’, groups engage in
colonization in a more active and explicit way.
Most colonizers, like those in the Americas, utilize many methods, both
subtle and brutal, to transcend indigenous populations and to justify taking their
lands and subordinating them. Greta Gaard, in her essay ‚Toward a Queer
Ecofeminism,‛ notes that colonizers of the Americas assessed many fundamental
aspects of indigenous life in relation to their own beliefs in order to place native
practices in the lower sphere of animalistic nature (Gaard 2004, 37). In fact,
Gaard asserts that
‚the rhetoric of Christian colonialism‛ allowed for a scenario in which
the Europeans filled the role of benevolent culture ‚civilizing‛ savage
nature—and this ‚civilizing‛ involved taking the natives’ homelands,
eliminating their cultural and spiritual practices, and raping and enslaving
their people.
(Gaard 2004, 34)
For colonizers of the Americas, native sexuality and gender relations ultimately
‚played a prominent role in the rhetoric and the justification of colonial
conquest‛ (Gaard 2004, 35).
Expanding on Plumwood’s master model, Gaard explains how colonial
nationalism, as a specific form of colonialism, is dependent upon the five
elements of backgrounding, radical exclusion, incorporation, instrumentalism,
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and homogenization within Plumwood’s master model (Gaard 2004, 37). Gaard
uses these points to highlight how myriad associations with nature, including
sexuality, ‚are used to authorize colonization‛ (Gaard 2004, 37).
The process of colonization of land entails many steps, from developing a
view of those to be colonized, through the actual appropriation of land. First, the
colonizer categorizes a place as ‘unused’ nature. In order to justify taking land
from others by utilizing the ‘fundamental’ power of culture over nature,
colonizers link indigenous groups to the land. By correlating interdependence
with and labor on the land to nature itself, domination of peoples, including
taking their lands, is just another act in which the master elevates culture above
nature. Those who use land in a non-reductionist way are discounted along with
nature (Shiva 1993, 32). Once a dominant group distinguishes native lands as
‚empty‛ and ‚valueless‛ nature, and the work done by indigenous groups as
trivial within the master’s dualistic framework and ‚hierarchy of activities‛
(Plumwood 1993, 48-49), appropriation by the master appears to follow logically,
if not justly as the colonizer might claim (Shiva 1993, 32).
The idea of putting land ‚to proper, rational use,‛ has existed as a part of
the ‚liberal-capitalist property formation mythology of western colonization‛ for
some time, and has roots in Locke’s formulation of autonomy (Plumwood 2002,
21). In this paradigm, the ‚rational labours of white European Heroes upon a
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passive, captive virgin earth called ‘nature’‛ are the basis of property formation,
a necessity of colonization (Plumwood 2002, 21). This paradigm, Plumwood
notes, currently conceptualizes colonized or marginalized groups as ‚losers. . .
such as the first world unemployed or third world subsistence farmers‛
(Plumwood 2002, 21). These groups are seen as part of ‘nature’, or at least
representing the less than rational qualities within it (Plumwood 2002, 21). Here,
the view of discontinuity becomes useful for the colonizer, who dissociates from,
and elevates himself above, the natural world.
While implicit structural components clearly affect the status and reality
of the colonized, and of the ‚losers‛ within a dualistic system, those dominant
within the structure do not view the system as faulty because it forms the reality
from which they benefit. Rather, they see those who do not succeed under, say,
‚current market rules,‛ as being like the ‚rationally deficient‛ slaves ‚in classical
times‛—inefficient and lacking sufficient rationality (Plumwood 2002, 21).
For example, Gaard quotes a Spanish decree that was read to the Kogi
people in 1498 before their colonization—though not in a language
comprehensible to them. It details the domination they were about to endure
under the Spanish, and ends with the statement: ‘‚I declare that the deaths and
harms which arise from this will be your fault, and not that of their highnesses,
nor mine, nor of the gentlemen who have come with me here (Ereira 1992, 74)‛’
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(Gaard 2004, 34-35). As this decree illustrates, responsibility for any ill-treatment
is often placed on the colonized or subordinated. A current example in which a
dominant group instrumentalizes and backgrounds others for its ends and then
blames the subordinate group for its marginalized position, comes from an issue
playing out currently within U.S. culture. It involves the prevalent dualistic
stance toward working illegal immigrants.
These immigrants are labeled as a detrimental force to the welfare of
unemployed American citizens by those asserting unquestioningly that the
illegals have no right to work in the U.S. Believing that employing these
immigrants takes viable jobs away from Americans, their contribution is
dismissed, though it is clear that often, they perform vital functions within
society, like gathering produce. Corporations instrumentalize them by paying
them less than competitive wages, at a level that is often extremely unfair
compensation for their work. Furthermore, by profiting from their labor and
contributions, corporations and the American population at large, background
them by utilizing their efforts for their personal good, while at the same time
denying its worth.
Most Americans assert that these immigrants are taking jobs that
Americans should fill. However, it appears that Americans reap benefits from
immigrant labor without acknowledging its contributions, and, that furthermore,
39

they avoid performing tasks that immigrants do readily—like menial labor, and
migrant farming. For example, when laws against immigrants were strictly
enforced in Alabama, and they fled from the threat of deportation, produce
remained unharvested, abandoned to rot in the fields (‚The Price of Intolerance‛
2011). These examples reveal how nature and groups like the Kogi and working
illegal immigrants deemed closer to it, are seen as external means to the master
culture’s ‚significant‛ ends. As these examples illustrate, those in the dominant
position within dualisms come to include aspects of indigenous life, and culture,
and to justify ‚collateral economic damage‛ to human groups associated with
non-rational nature (Plumwood 2002, 21).
Teresa Brennan’s description of the ‚cultural mythology of male-coded
reason mastering female-coded nature‛ as ‚a ‘sadodispassionate’ drama,‛
illustrates why intersubjective connections are ethically vital (Plumwood 2002,
22). In her striking interpretation, the hero of this drama uses the reason/emotion
dualism, as well as the ‚associated ideals of detached rationality to deny or cut
off empathy or identification with the Other‛ (Plumwood 2002, 22).
‚The sadodispassionate is the doctor who experiments on his or her
fellow creatures, such as the disabled put to death in Nazi institutions. He
feels nothing when he should feel empathy, and we recognize this as a
grievous moral failing.‛
(Plumwood 2002, 22)
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Early in American history, Thomas More justified appropriation of land in
a dispassionate manner. He viewed commandeering it for the colonizers’
purposes as the enactment of the positive ideal of putting land to good use.
However, for More, appropriate use of the land meant profitable use for the
master, and he discounted all other uses, including those long established by
indigenous populations. The colonization of indigenous lands was the concrete
outcome of this ideal (Shiva 1993, 32). In contrast to this principle, Native
American writers, Roberta J. Hill and Gloria Bird, discuss their own perceptions
and experiences of colonization by the United States government. In Hill’s essay,
‚Immersed in Words,‛ she introduces the ‚Black Hawk War‛ as an example of
the way that the U.S. government has used Native Americans as means to their
ends throughout America’s history.
This war was a struggle for land in which colonizers discounted the
vitality and existence of Indian ways of life, as well as cut short numerous Indian
lives. Hill uses the war to bridge her discussion of early American colonial acts
with modern ways in which the government ‘has continuously worked to define
and control its ‚Indian people‛’ (Hill 1998, 77). Explaining how the reductive
process of homogenization/stereotyping has denigrated the Native American
people, Hill states that ‚*a+ll the beauty and diversity of our ways of life are
lumped into a singular American-made, tourist-trade arti-fact‛ (Hill 1998, 77):
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[t]he colonizing historians created views about the history and values of
Indian peoples and their influence on American culture. From their
perspective, Indian peoples and their cultures were curiosities, objects of
scorn, or obstructions to expansion.
(Hill 1998, 83)
She suggests that the government meets Native resistance to political policies
that appear to enforce modern forms of colonialism by amending bills ‚to swing
the pendulum of oppression in a different arc‛ (Hill 1998, 77). For example,
instead of the explicit appropriations of land, now, issues about how to classify
Indians within groups related to heritage becomes essential to controlling them
within the master model where homogenization and exclusion is a powerful
mechanism. Those outside of Native American culture make many of the
determinations about Indian heritage not their own. Additionally, they foster an
internal conflict and animosity between Indians who must include or exclude
more tenuously connected members of their group who may have moved off
Indian reservations or married non-Indians.
Gloria Bird’s essay, ‚Breaking the Silence: Writing as ‚Witness,‛ further
illuminates historical colonialism through the personal testimonial of Bird’s own
experience with colonization of lands, as well as her life on reservations. She
states that ‚*a+ complex of strains on our communities exists as a result of
colonization—the conversion to Christianity, for example‛ (Bird 1998, 31). Bird
claims that government, culture, and media continue to marginalize Indian
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communities (Bird 1998, 29). She asserts that this marginalization stems from
colonization, and the likelihood that Native Americans ‘‛were never meant to
survive‛’ (Bird 1998, 29).
What both authors note is that, within modern U.S. politics, the dualistic
activities of colonization and appropriation take on new forms as time goes on.
Instead of taking the lands to ‘put to good use’, Native American lands are now
commonly used by the U.S. for dumping radioactive and toxic waste (Hill 1998,
81; Bird 1998, 27). In fact, due to the disproportionate use of Native American
lands for dumping, in 1994, the Clinton administration ‚redefined environmental
hazards in low-income and minority communities as a civil rights issue‛
(Adamson 2001, 52). Bird also states, echoing the sentiments of Gaard and
Plumwood, that government agencies are ‚intent on colonizing the minds of the
people‛ (Bird 1998, 27). As I will elucidate in a later section, like Bird and Hill,
many Native Americans utilize artistic practice as a means of fighting the
colonization of Indian minds and land. As Bird states,
. . . being Indian in the United States is inherently political. . . In light
of this, I see my personal story as bearing witness to colonization and my
writing as a testimony aimed at undoing those processes that attempt to
keep us in the grips of the colonizer’s mental bondage.
(Bird 1998, 29)
Bird focuses on the personal aspects of Indian lives that colonization has affected,
and continues to affect. She believes in the importance of autobiography as the
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practice of ‚witnessing,‛ in order to ‚identify those instances in which we have
internalized what we are taught about ourselves‛ and to ‚rewrite our history.‛
(Bird 1998, 29-30).
Attempts to fight colonization, the way Bird and Hill do, involve what
Elizabeth Deloughrey and George B. Handley call, ‚postcolonial poetics‛
(Deloughrey and Handley 2011, 29). These practices reimagine relationships
where fragmentation exists (Deloughrey and Handley 2011, 29). ‚*W+ithout
either idealizing fragmentation or yearning nostalgically for wholeness‛ these
strategies avoid making identity ‚static or predetermined‛ ( Deloughrey and
Handley 2011, 29). Rather, identity is ‚created by the imagination’s virtual and
cross-cultural journey across geographies and difference‛ (Deloughrey and
Handley 2011, 29). These methods of revision use experiential relationships with
a place, often a specific geographic region that is a site of meaning for a group.
Due to colonization and its effects, such as destroying a long-held relationship
with a particular place, it is necessary for displaced groups to take active steps in
developing their identity. This helps them counteract some of the internalization
of negative effects of the denigration stemming from domination and
colonization. Having been herded away from their way of life and/or land, they
must find a new sense of identity of their own, and a new relationship to their
land and its unfolding history.
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The Feminist Move to Care Ethics
The study of power is a study of relationships. Feminist philosophy sees
relationships quite differently than do many strands of traditional Western
philosophy. Women’s historical social roles and unique biological status,
including the ability to experience motherhood, inform the feminist perspective
on relationships, and bring the idea of ‚care‛ assertively into the discussion.
While many feminists possessing varying theoretical bases work to
reconceptualize power as a ‚capacity or ability, specifically, the capacity to
empower or transform oneself and others,‛ it is important to note that, for
Foucault, the forces that constitute biopower are internalized, as well as partially
produced by their subjects, though not straightforwardly and consciously (Allen
2011, 26). Therefore, one’s choices are contingent upon those forces to some
extent. Like some Native American authors’ interpretations of their lives as
internalizing the attitudes of their colonizers, historical contingencies come
implicitly to bear on one’s identity under the biopower conceptualization.
Though the ethics of care can encompass many definitions of care, I find
Peta Bowden’s assertion on ‘caring’ to be a helpful starting point within the
discussion. She states that caring
‛expresses ethically significant ways in which we matter to each other,
transforming interpersonal relatedness into something beyond ontological
necessity or brute survival‛ (Bowden 1997, 1).
(Held 2004, 62)
45

This explanation of caring goes beyond the notion that caring is predominantly
the labor, the utilitarian production of care, provided to someone in need (Held
2004, 60). It also implicitly advances the idea that the two major aspects of caring
unite to form an ethically productive sense of care. Both care, as the doing of the
things needed to care for someone, and care, as the feeling of ‘‚caring about‛’
someone or something, are important to care ethics (Held 2004, 60).
These two elements form a continuity that relates the internalization of the
feeling of caring about someone’s well-being to the actual act of caring for
another, similar to the relation and intertwinement of reason/emotion, or
sensibility/intelligibility. As Held states, ‚*a+n important aspect of care is how it
expresses our attitudes and relationships‛ (Held 2004, 61). It is in this continuity
between the attitudes of care and the actions of care that I see a parallel with
ethics based on practice, particularly with engaged artistic practices in which the
artist relates uniquely to the world, and expresses a concept intended for
reception by another, an audience (even if that audience is the artist him/herself).
Utilizing the mind and body together with an awareness of these intersubjective
interactions is a basis for counteracting dualisms. Similar to the unification of
traits like mind and body, Sara Ruddick reveals how care ethics combines
elements of labor and relationship, stating

46

‛as much as care is labor, it is also relationship . . . caring labor is
intrinsically relational. The work is constituted in and through the
relation of those who give and receive care. . .‛ (Ruddick 1998, 13-14).
(Held 2004, 62)
It is at the intersection of the mutually reinforcing actions of giving care and
feeling care about something where ethical decisions are made, similar to the
way ethical decisions are made within practice in practice-based ethics.
Furthermore, Nel Noddings focuses on the necessity of ‘‛engrossment‛’
with the other (Held 2004, 61 and 62). This ‚engrossment‛ encompasses
attentiveness ‚to the feelings, needs, desires, and thoughts of those cared for and
a skill in understanding a situation from that person’s point of view‛ as being
‚central to caring for someone‛ (Held 2004, 60). While this approach creates a
novel subject/object pair—the ‘carer’ and the ‘cared-for’—it does not appear to
simply reverse the master/slave dualism. Rather than either party being cast in
the role of slave to the other, the relationships fostered by care ethics allow the
subject and object to relate to each other in a manner that highlights their
interdependence and is beneficial to them both.
For instance, caring for the earth may appear to place the caring
individual at the call of the environment. However, due to the need of the
human/subject for a healthy environment and the need of the nature/object to be
treated in a life-sustaining manner, the subject and object share in the rewards of
a mutually beneficial system. Like this one, many examples of care relationships
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focus on the actions/responsibilities of the individual deemed as the ‘carer’.
These scenarios focus on descriptions and prescriptions of moral agents who
represent those ethically capable to care for another. However, the
acknowledgement of interdependence inherent in the heart of care ethics
suggests that the ethically ‘responsible’ parties are not merely subject to the
demands of others, rather, they are involved in systems in which they benefit as
well. As Dewey asserted, life persists ‚through interaction with‛ the
environment (Dewey 1934, 12), and at their core, many relationships seem to
share this high level of symbiosis.
Using Noddings’ perspective, the cognitive state of the one giving care
appears to highlight differences explicated in Erin McCarthy’s explanation of
intimacy and integrity based world orientations. These orientations, which I
explain more fully in the following section, reveal a set of dispositions toward
others in the world. Noddings asserts that the ‘carer’ is engaging in a
‘‛receptive-intuitive‛’ understanding and empathy of the other’s needs, rather
than an ‘‛objective-analytic‛’ one (Held 2004, 60).
One can only sustain the possibility of ‚a natural impulse to care for
others,‛ however, by committing morally ‚to the ideal of caring,‛ according to
Noddings (Held 2004, 60). Sara Ruddick explains the way that care, ‚as a kind of
labor rather than an already normative concept contrasted with justice‛ can
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stimulate an ethics (Held, 64). Ruddick’s explanation illustrates the more
‚context-respectful approaches‛ of care ethics (Held 1998, 99)
‛The ‚ethics‛ of care is provoked by the habits and challenges of the
work, makes sense of its aims, and spurs and reflects upon the selfunderstanding of workers. The ethics also extends beyond the activities
from which it arises, generating a stance (or standpoint) toward ‚nature,‛
human relationships, and social institutions. . . . First, memories of
caring and being cared for inspire a sense of obligation. . . . [And] a
person normatively identifies with a conception of herself as someone
who enters into and values caring relationships, exercising particular
human capacities as well. Neither memory nor identity ‚gives rise‛ to an
‚ethics‛ that then leaves them behind. Rather there is an interplay in
which each recreates the other‛ (Ruddick 1998, 20-21).
(Held 2004, 64).
Ruddick’s explanation acknowledges the personal, active habits of caring labor,
in a way that appears similar to the notion of embodied practices because the
work itself further develops the relationship between the carer and the cared-for.
The artistic practices that I will illustrate engender and reinforce a more
relational ethical stance toward others through similar mechanisms of
engagement. Furthermore, Ruddick’s view of caring work, and the selfreflection and cultivation engendered by it, develop an ethical perspective in
which care is generated by the carer’s engagement with the cared-for. Artistic
practice often functions as a process mirroring and expanding this type of selfcultivating, engaged caring.
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Theory and Practice: Knowing-how versus Knowing-that
Strengthening the ethics of care, where to begin: rules, virtuous traits,
or embodied action?
‚The object of our enquiry is not to know what virtue is but how to
become good, and that is the sole benefit of it.‛
Aristotle (Shaw in Hull 2005, 65)
The differences between various ethical approaches often involve the
distinctions between the components of theory, practice, and application. A
predominant difference between these approaches, I assert, stems from how they
combine within the context of actually ‘being’ in the real-world. Each theoretical
approach shapes decisions in differing, though not thoroughly oppositional
methods. Most Western philosophy separates out the components of modes of
doing. For instance, theory is often separated from practice, or, as Maraldo
states, from action.
This model perceives ‚practice as divided from a goal that is the point of
an activity or action, the real reason for doing something‛ (Maraldo 2009, 8-9).
This division locates practice in the sphere of mere means, while theory
represents the end provided through practice. If not for the goal of theory, then,
practice would be obsolete. Within this type of dualist paradigm, the goal of
reaching an ‘ideal’ devalues practice in favor of theory. This paradigm is rooted
in the ancient philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Theory, as an abstract function
of reason, could be associated with Plato’s idealized forms, seen as determinant
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and oriented toward maleness and culture (Held, 93). Practice, on the other
hand, due to its engagement with the actual physical world, resembles Aristotle’s
view of matter as associated with femaleness and indefiniteness. Matter was,
thus, considered closer to nature and further from morality—a view that became
entrenched in much Western philosophical/ethical thought (Held, 93).
Theories, as used within this system, it follows, are the abstract
propositions, separate from real-life experience that generally form the
foundation, the starting point, for ethical action within much of Western
philosophy (Maraldo 2009, 9). In various Eastern systems, however, practice,
while also allowing for progression toward a more ideal state of awareness, is
itself both a path, and a state of enlightenment (Carter 2008, 5). Related to the
theory/practice difference, the concept of application forms another nuance
within ethical systems. However, while both are, in some sense, action-oriented,
clear-cut and important differences exist between practice and application
(Maraldo 2009, 9).
Practice, within ‚East-Asian philosophical traditions‛ can be considered
‚knowing by way of practice,‛ while application of a principle or theory entails
possessing a precise enough grasp, or knowledge, of its scheme in order to apply
it to a given situation (Maraldo 2009, 9 my emphasis). I assert that one of the
major distinctions between rule-based, virtue-based, and practice-based ethics is
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the different emphasis and sequencing of the process for coming to ethical
decisions within these systems.
Imagine a continuum with the category of rules at one end, engaged
actions at the other, and virtuous traits somewhere in between and extending
toward both ends. Within Western deontological ethical systems, the rule end of
the continuum is the starting point for the process of ethical action. Once the rule
is decided upon, learned, and independently ‚discursively examine*d+,‛ it can be
applied to a given situation (Maraldo 2009, 10-11). At the time of its application,
it does not entail seeking out authentic ethical truth in the sense of discovery or
‚indication‛ (Maraldo 2009, 10), but merely creation of correspondence between
a given action and a given structure/rule that has already been logically analyzed
and decided upon outside of the phenomenological experience to which it
relates. In such a system, therefore, the analysis of the rule is done through
thought coming before, and separated from action. Consequently, it is largely
unresponsive to the intuitions occurring alongside the action within the specific
contexts—as they may differ from mere application of the rule.
The next step on the continuum comprises virtue ethics, which
emphasizes deeply ingrained dispositions of goodness—traits that inspire right
action within the procedure of ethical decision-making (Hursthouse 2010).
Virtuous traits and the ethical acts of those who possess them, fulfill various
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functions, one of which is the standardization or normalization of rules codifying
the acts of those possessing virtue. Application, then, within virtue ethics, could
be characterized as the act of emulating the virtuous. This undertaking ‚is not
the sort of thing that can be grasped by a general definition that is subsequently
applied,‛ however (Maraldo 2009, 12). For Maraldo, therefore, Aristotelian type
virtue ethics calls for a virtue to be ‚tested by actions, by repeated actions that let
one . . . perform it excellently, almost by second nature,‛ in order to internalize
and to fully understand it. (Maraldo 2009, 12).
Maraldo sees Aristotelian virtue ethics as containing the seeds of practice
as he understands it to exist within Japanese philosophy (Maraldo 2009, 13).
Furthermore, he distinguishes between types of practice by utilizing the Greek
distinction of praxis and poiesis. Maraldo indicates that Aristotle, in contrast to
Plato, saw praxis as a type of practice ‚that does not result in a product (ergon)
separate from the activity,‛ as does the production of theory as the end goal of
practice seen in many ethical systems (as poeisis). (Maraldo 2009, 14).
Aristotle’s system, however, did require that both types of practice be
‚based on a theoretical account, a logos, that is separate from the doing or the
making and that informs and guides them‛ (Maraldo 2009, 14). The locus of
ethical decision-making within Aristotelian virtue ethics, therefore, still
maintains some distance between the agent and the object, —that which is
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affected by his or her actions—because the decision is made before and separated
from those who are affected by it.
Practice, as bodily engagement, however, encompasses a stronger sense of
being intuitively compelled to perform a specific ethical behavior. This entails
more than merely ‘choosing’ one, since it emanates from the intersubjective
engagement between an agent and the objects inspiring ethical concern. In this
paradigm, the concern, the ethical stance, is discovered and/or formed through
the engaged interaction itself, and like care ethics, it encompasses a ‚contextrespectful approach‛ (Held, 99). Regarding embodied engagement, John Russon
states, ‚[o]ur bodies are the living processes by which we establish contact with
reality‛ (Russon 2003, 21). They are ‚the point where each of us is something
specific,‛ where we develop the structures of ‚being open to being hurt and
being open to the pursuit of pleasure,‛ the ‚structures of embodiment‛ (Russon
2003, 21). Being a body, Russon asserts, is the way to form engagements and
empathy with other entities (Russon 2003, 21).
Dewey fleshes out this idea of bodily engagement with other entities by
emphasizing that generally, in relationships, entities form reciprocal interactions.
This suggests to Dewey, that nothing attained by the human, by ‚the highest
flight of thought . . . or penetrated by any probing insight is inherently such
that it may not become the heart and core of sense.‛ I interpret this statement to
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mean that any ideal element can find deeper articulation of expression in
embodied form, or at least a fundamental connection to it (Dewey 1934, 30).
Advancing these concepts of embodiment into the ethical realm, Erin McCarthy
states in her essay, Towards a Transnational Ethics of Care,
When the relational aspect of self-hood is foregrounded, when being in
relation is recognized as an integral part of what it is to be a human-beingin-the-world, then we are one step further on our way toward an ethics of
care.
(McCarthy 2008, 113)
Utilizing Thomas Kasulis’ 2002 book, Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and
Cultural Difference, McCarthy highlights two world orientations, ‚intimacy
oriented and integrity oriented‛ (McCarthy 2008, 114). Though there are no
cultures possessing these orientations in a radical form, Western philosophy’s
predominant perspectives on ‚selfhood and identity,‛ as well as its
categorization of ‚an ethics of justice‛ follow the integrity orientation. The
characteristics of this orientation are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Public verifiability of objectivity.
Emphasis on external, rather than internal relations.
Lack of affect within knowledge.
Division of the ‚intellectual and psychological‛ from the somatic, or
bodily.
5. Self-consciousness of and reflection on the grounds of knowledge.
(McCarthy 2008, 114)
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Contrasting this Western, integrity-oriented model, is the intimacyoriented paradigm, which includes certain values corresponding to elements of
Asian philosophy (McCarthy 2008, 114). Within this orientation:
1. Intimacy is ‚personal rather than public,‛ though also considered
objective.
2. The line between oneself and the other within an intimate relationship
typically is blurred.
3. Knowledge that is ‚intimate‛ demonstrates elements of affect.
4. ‚Intimacy is somatic as well as psychological.‛
5. The foundation of intimacy lacks the ‚self-conscious, reflective, or selfilluminating‛ qualities of knowledge within an integrity-oriented
culture.
(McCarthy 2008, 114).
While both orientations have value, in certain philosophies embracing the
intimacy orientation, positive traits that foster intersubjective relations and
continuity with emotional and natural elements of life predominate. For
instance, rather than testing criteria for right action, according to Carter, Japanese
philosophy focuses on the ‚development of character and of the whole person‛
and integrates ethics into daily life and artistic practices as well (Carter 2008, 5).
In Carter’s chapter on the ‚Way of Pottery,‛ he states that Zen Buddhism fosters
the idea that, though the world functions dualistically, one ‚can be free of the
constraints of duality‛ (Carter 2008, 120). The ideal of functioning nondualistically, Carter asserts, is cultivated by becoming aware of ‚one’s own
nature,‛ in which one finds ‚the undifferentiated, the unborn, nothingness‛ by
letting go of one’s ego (Carter 2008, 121).
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By ‚breaking. . . the chains of ordinary seeing‛ and living a ‚lifetime of
renewal and dedication‛ to one’s artistic practice, the ‚line between oneself and
the other,‛ as McCarthy stated regarding the intimacy-orientation, ‚is blurred‛
(McCarthy 2008, 114). Furthermore, as Carter explains regarding the ‚Way of
Tea,‛ on the relationship of the self to the other, ‚the goal is to eliminate the gap
completely‛ (Carter 2008, 94). The practice of the Tea Ceremony is meant to
remove all boundaries between a host and a guest, the self and the ritual act;
ideally, these pairs of elements should become unified (Carter 2008, 94). The
desired effect of closing the gap is elevation of participants to ‚a higher state of
awareness, a higher level of kindness and appreciation. . . where the idea of
rank is jettisoned altogether‛ (Carter 2008, 94). This striving for ‚no distinction
between self and other,‛ is a total absorption ‚in that which is to be known, to be
loved‛ (Carter 2008, 130). Regarding this level of engagement, Nishida states:
‚We forget the self, and at this point an incomprehensible power beyond
the self functions alone in all of its majesty; there is neither subject nor
object, but only the true union of subject and object‛ (Nishida 1990, 17475).
(Carter 2008, 130)
Additionally, ethics within Japanese culture perceives Enlightenment as
encompassed within practice itself, and ethics itself as a sense of ‚living as fully
as possible with others and in nature‛ (Carter 2008, 5). Though Asian traditions
sometimes make conceptual distinctions between mind and body, Carter asserts
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that no ontological distinction exists (Carter 2008, 9). In fact, the Japanese word,
kokoro, encompasses the idea of mind/heart, and ‚the showing of humanheartedness without an ulterior motive‛ (Carter 2008, 149). Thus, several
dualisms that affect Western philosophy are absent in some of these traditions,
like mind/body, reason/emotion, thought/action.
Since the mutual exclusivity of the mind and body is nonexistent, other
attitudes that play off of this dualism hold less power. For instance, the Japanese
tradition opposes much Western integrity-oriented thought, in which dominant
perspectives hierarchize and categorize sets of objects dualistically. In these
dualistic relations, those seen as possessing more human rationality are ranked
above those seen to possess less. Since Japanese philosophy and culture sees
mind/heart as united, distinguishing those others, like elements of nature, that
appear to lack rational thought/mind is not a strong basis for denigrating them.
In her book, Boundaries, American architect and sculptor, Maya Lin
introduces several examples through her art and architecture, of what appear to
be a marriage of intimacy and integrity-based world orientations. The influence
of the life and aesthetics of her father, a Japanese potter living in America,
heavily influenced Lin’s artistic perspective. Living in a home ‚in the city, yet
separate from it, always surrounded by the natural environment,‛ her father
worked with clay ‚effortlessly as a fluid, plastic medium,‛ interacting with it,
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kneading and shaping it for hours (Lin 2000, 7:03). Lin says that later, she
realized that her works were often generated ‚from a completely organic, handshaped method‛ influenced by her long held ‚affinity. . . toward sculpting the
earth‛ (Lin 2000, 7:03).
In contrast, at Yale University, Lin learned the formal elements of
architecture and sculpture, through what can be seen as a more integrityoriented approach—with objective, formal external relations and motivations as
likely bases for making aesthetic decisions. Her unique sensibilities, however,
imbue the elements of the formal academic approach within her method and
artwork with a sense of the intimacy world orientation. For example, Lin
describes her architectural works as utilizing the concepts of ‚paths,‛ ‚light,‛
and ‚asymmetry‛ in ways that seem to map onto an intimacy based orientation
(Lin 2000, 10:04). Working with ‚paths‛ to create ‚spaces that flow, freely,
seamlessly,‛ Lin ‚thinks in terms of interfaces, how people live in and move
through the space, how they feel it, not how they interpret it‛ (Lin, 10:04). In this
way, she creates a clearly intimacy based approach in which, not only affective
responses are important, but intimacy, as explained by McCarthy, is both
psychological and somatic as well (Lin 2000, 10:04).
Lin states that each work she creates ‚originates from a simple desire to
make people aware of their surroundings, not just the physical world but also
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the psychological world we live in,‛ a concept that mirrors the intimacy-oriented
view that mind and body cannot be ontologically separated (Lin 2000, 2:03).
Though attracted to ‚presenting factual information‛ through her work, her
ultimate concern is for creating ‚places in which to think, without trying to
dictate what to think‛ (Lin 2000, 2:03). Additionally, regardless of a work’s
motivation, whether inspired by social ideas or, alternatively, by ‚purely
aesthetic levels of experience,‛ she attempts to make artistic choices that ‚create
an intimate dialogue with the viewer,‛ in which the viewer actively participates
with the work (Lin 2000, 2:03). For example, the scale of the typeface that Lin
chose to be chiseled into the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was a contentious
issue. Smaller than one half of an inch, it is ‚unheard of in monument type
sizing‛ (Lin 2000, 4:14). ‚What it does is create a very intimate reading in a very
public space, the difference in intimacy between reading a billboard and reading
a book‛ (Lin 2000, 4:14).
Like the intimacy-oriented approach, in which the involvement that is
intimacy, includes objective elements, while being ‚personal rather than public,‛
Lin hopes to create private conversations with each viewer, ‚no matter how
public each work is and no matter how many people are present‛ (Lin 2000,
2:03). The works have a tactile quality. ‚This active participation. . . involves
the viewer in a direct and intimate dialogue with the work‛ (Lin 2000, 2:03). Lin
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realized that she was successful in creating intimacy in her design of the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial when she first visited it after completion. She states, ‚I found
myself searching out the name of a friend’s father and touching it. It was strange
to realize that I was another visitor and I was reacting to it as I had designed it‛
(Lin 2000, 4:17).
III. The Contribution of Embodied Artistic Practices
‚Creativity and thus art, by its nature, is celebrative and calls for a loving
consciousness. Creativity, I would argue, always manifests concern; and thus by
its very nature, art is a celebration of personhood and world.‛
(Deutsch 1996, 86-87, my emphasis).
Fingers infusing color into paper. Hand and ear interacting, discovering
harmony on strings. The writer bonding words and ideas into novel
combinations. Learning to truly perceive and sense the world’s subtle nuances
through its physical elements. How can acts such as these enhance an ethical
system? Creating visual art, music, and written works—especially poetry and
prose—are examples of what, at the most authentic level, is pure creative artistic
production. These processes, however, are more than means to ends. By
utilizing embodied practices as unique mechanisms whose components have
ethical implications, artistic practices represent a dynamic method for vitalizing
the richness and intersubjectivity of the ethics of care.
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These practices foster a holistic engagement with others through
experiential interaction with physical materials, elementals, ideas and subject
matter. By meeting these substances at the threshold of one’s interaction with
the world—as Russon dubs it, in one’s body, one becomes receptive to them in a
richer sense that encompasses somatic, affective, and responsive elements of the
mind/heart. Within these practices, one learns to deal with other varied
substances and entities in an ‚engrossed,‛ face-to-face engagement, and begins
to understand their natures. As in care ethics, this attentiveness to the situation
and the context, including to materials, to feelings, to thoughts, and to other
elements of existence, fosters a sense of empathy that is necessary for acting in an
authentically caring manner toward another. Through these refined attunements
to others, these methods can cultivate a more empathic, and mutually beneficial
relationship with the environmental other.
Along with these artistic practices, many elements, such as knowledge of
the mechanisms of social structures that promote alienating and instrumental
reasoning, understanding of the way that these structures affect others, as well as
identification of whom they affect are important to the cultivation of a mature
and encompassing ethical approach. However, by fostering a more holistic and
encompassing sense of awareness, engaging embodied artistic practices facilitate
changes in ethical practices and relationships.
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Through contact/engagement with materials, ideas, and objects, one is
stimulated into actions that open one up to inter-relational awareness and the reevaluation of one’s perception of the relationship of self to other. Though I
utilize examples of artists who have already metamorphosed extensively
through such practices, I believe that a non-artist can be drawn to these types of
practices, and experience these changes in attunement over time. Similar to the
way that education refines ones intellect through a process of conscious and
unconscious learning through years of habitual practices, over time, artistic
practices utilizing intense interaction and care for materials and ideas can
enhance one’s view of the ‘other’ and one’s empathic and ethical attitude toward
it.
As Eliot Deutsch states in the Chapter, ‚Aesthetic Experience and the
Artwork,‛ in Essays on the Nature of Art,
the experience of an artwork (which is aesthetically forceful, meaningful,
and beautiful) involves. . . assimilation, recognition, and discernment and
calls for a special appropriation that yields an integrated wholeness.
(Deutsch 1996, 31)
This explanation, representative of the perspective of the viewer of art, describes
a mode of incorporating and accepting a work of art ‚into our emotional texture‛
as, what he calls, ‚a kind of empathetic embrace‛ (Deutsch 1996, 31). In this
positive sense, incorporation involves the mind/heart in a holistic process of
engaging with an artwork intellectually, emotionally, viscerally, and possibly
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even physically or tactically. Though appearing to emphasize the viewer,
Deutsch’s explanation includes both the process of creating, as well as the
process of reception, of the work. For example, Deutsch explains ‘assimilation’
as an influence that awakens ‚feeling to what is presented by the artwork‛
similar to the way that the artist’s ‚power and rhythm of being‛ influenced the
work itself (Deutsch 1996, 31). Thus, Deutsch’s concept establishes the idea that
art is part of a multifaceted process of transformation in which an artist
transforms materials, the process of creation transforms the artist, and the work
transforms the viewer.
By explaining some theoretical bases and providing examples of artists
and artistic movements, in what follows, I will attempt to explain embodied
artistic practices more thoroughly. These examples reveal how these practices
and processes can form lifelong paths, or ‚Ways,‛ that engender four levels of
positive ethical effects. Through an explanation of the way embodied artistic
processes flow as ‚pure experience‛ through the artist out toward another
individual, and then to a group of others, I attempt to clarify fundamental ethical
elements of artistic practices. Understanding how these processes affect
individuals and groups helps show how they engender empathy, or care, in
intersubjective relations.
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First, I will show specifically how artistic practices encompass several
unique ways of relating to the world. I argue that the visual artist, the musician,
and the writer, first must ‚see‛ the world in a distinctively ‘open’ way, they must
be attentive. Through philosophical concepts and concrete examples, I tie this
notion of attentiveness to perspectives on relating ethically that I believe can be
applied to interactions with, often objectified, ‘others’, including elements of the
natural environment. Within this formulation, I develop a model in which
attentiveness produced through artistic engagement exists as a relevant means of
counteracting those traits and practices – inattentiveness in the form of dualisms,
reductionism, viewing nature/culture as discontinuous, and colonization – that
negatively impact the environment and people’s place within it.
Within the second level of effects, I develop the assertion that the act of
genuine ‘seeing’ developed early in the flow of habitual artistic processes is a
fundamental experiential practice in artistic engagement. This practice leads the
artist to engage actively with a subject and an idea in more authentic, embodied,
physically based ways (or to highlight an absence of embodied engagement, as is
often done in art utilizing intangible elementals). This highly engaged
exploration implicates both the artist’s choice of materials and of subject matter,
and forms the basis of subsequent unique practices utilized in the arts. Within
these practices, unforeseen relationships, springing from creative
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imagination/artistic intuition, and unification of conscious and unconscious
elements, support radical juxtaposition and defamiliarization of everyday
perceptions. Additionally, free play with materials, ideas, and subjects of
artworks, creates a mindfulness leading to a more genuine sense of care for
‘others’ of various types through visceral, emotional, and intellectual relations
and interrelations that evade everyday unquestioned habits and norms.
The third level occurs as those external to the artist, the audience, respond
to the process. An individual relating to the works produced, be they written,
musical, or visual, may discover ideas, newly linked in his/her mind, through
various types of experiences or combinations of experiences with the works, be
they affective, intellectual, visceral, or even tactile, like the intimate touch
inspired by the small typeface gracing the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.
As the artist establishes a habitual way of opening up to the possibilities
presented by materials and ideas, and the regular viewer establishes a habit of
‚seeing‛ as a distinct practice of refining his or her awareness, space opens up
for a more nuanced, holistic attunement to ‘others.’ These practices form what
Asian cultures, such as Japanese, especially those practicing elements of Zen
Buddhism, might call ‚Ways‛ (Carter 2008, 75). A ‚Way‛ delineates ‚disciplines
and techniques‛ taught within specific practices, such as the ‚Way of Tea,‛ or
‚The Way of Pottery‛ (Carter 2008, 75). Additionally, an individual practicing
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the habits utilized in a ‚Way‛ is meant to extrapolate them throughout the
spheres of his or her life. Finally, these habits ‚become internalized as
spontaneous reactions to the varied happenings of everyday life,‛ similar to
Maraldo’s understanding of Aristotelian virtue ethics (Carter 2008, 75).
Through the habitual, engaged, bodily experiences of bodymind
coordination engendered by the ‚Ways,‛ new relationships to people, animals,
and things develop. This fourth level of ethics, stemming from habitual artistic
engagement, has influenced social movements, such as the Civil Rights
Movement, which relied heavily on the power of folk music. These movements
express various humanitarian concerns and forms of activism involving empathy
and care.
Ethics through the Development of Embodied Artistic Habits, Traits, and
Practices: Artist and Viewer
‚*L+earning to be kind is not just the intellectual recognition of what kindness is,
but through mind and body as unified, one actually practices being kind.‛
(Carter 2008, 90).
As Carter states, ‚*a+ major part of ethics is being able to recognize the
value and worth of another‛ (Carter 2008, 38). In order to build new, more
caring ethical relationships that realize value in another, one must become open
to the possibility of new all-embracing relationships in which one meets others
‚at an intrinsic level‛ where the other is a ‚thou‛ (Carter 2008, 94). This
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approach, of relating to another on a basic, phenomenological level, follows the
intimacy world orientation and the contextual engagement of care ethics since
one’s personal interaction and response to the other takes precedence over
external, abstract perspectives of it. That is, the somatic, affective, and
psychological elements present when one is engaging with another, inform one’s
stance toward it. This type of perception and recognition of the other’s worth,
therefore, contrasts with the integrity world orientation, as well as Kant’s
formulation of respect, in which respect is formal and abstract, and framed as a
generalized respect for rational humanity. Toward the goal of discovering a new
type of ethical intersubjectivity that Carter’s ideas support, I explore Kelly
Oliver’s essay on Luce Irigary, ‚Vision, Recognition, and a Passion for the
Elements.‛
Oliver’s essay introduces Irigaray’s ethical ideas regarding the
irreducibility of subjects and objects (to each other) within relationships and in
communication. In attempting to synthesize some of Irigaray’s thoughts, Oliver
states, ‚[c]ommunication does not demand subordination or assimilation. It
does not require a master-slave relationship,‛ rather the ability to form social
relationships comes from recognizing the self’s limits (Oliver 2007, 131). Here,
limits hold no negative connotation, but rather, form the delineation between
separate entities. This distinction allows one to appreciate another through more
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caring ethical relationships that foster a fuller awareness and acceptance of
another’s differences, without dualistically homogenizing, instrumentalizing, or
radically excluding another.
In The Ethics of Earth Art, Amanda Boetzkes describes Irigaray’s ethics of
alterity regarding the interaction between self and others through a discussion of
elementals. Elementals include such substances as light, air, and sky, and
distinguish themselves from things because, though one may still experience
them through the senses, on some level they remain boundless and
uncontainable (Boetzkes 2010, 102). Furthermore, elementals exceed or engulf
one’s field of perception because though they are sensed—touched, seen, etc.—
they remain ultimately intangible, and therefore, in a fundamental way,
withdrawn from the senses (Boetzkes 2010, 102).
Because of these ephemeral qualities of elementals, Irigaray
conceptualizes the category of ‚the elemental as the medium of alterity,‛ and
Boetzkes asserts that elementals within this model, expose, as well as ‚disrupt
embodied perception‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 109,107). Earth art that utilizes
elementals, therefore, destabilizes the way in which one confronts a particular
artistic expression, or environment (Boetzkes 2010, 142). The subject becomes
‚receptive to a manifestation of elemental phenomena.‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 142).
That is to say, elementals foster a different view of the world through one’s
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perception of their physical qualities (Boetzkes 2010, 142). Through the
apprehension of the nuances that they add to existence, like color, shape, and
texture, the ‚solipsistic‛ view of the world is replaced by a less controlling and
instrumentalizing perception of and attitude toward the earth (Boetzkes 2010,
142).
Due to their particular unbounded qualities, elementals inspire a critical
move within the subject for relating ethically to the other, the gesture of
‚acknowledging the excess of the other and of the world‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 107).
Awareness of elementals, therefore, sets up a sense of the limits between self and
other, or self and world. These limits are the basis of utilizing a mode of
retraction as an ethical act (Boetzkes 2010, 107). Retraction is the subject’s act of
separating itself from others, and world. This ‚retracted mode of being‛ is a
basis for an ‚opening of the senses‛ because for one operating within this mode,
elementals provide the means for the subject to distance itself from the other and
see the other in a less self-interested manner. Thus, elementals function as a
meeting point between self and other (Boetzkes 2010, 106, 109).
This point where subject meets object constitutes Irigaray’s ‚partition of
difference,‛ and, according to her, recognizing it precludes one from obscuring
the expression of an other, expression being the manifestation of another’s way
of being, including its ways of communicating and its differences from the
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subject. Though this model emphasizes distance and difference, in Irigaray’s
formulation they exist in a sense that is distinct from the negative incarnations of
distance and difference used in subordinating dualisms. Rather, they function to
help one avoid incorporating and instrumentalizing the other by respecting the
other’s difference. The subject’s act of pulling back within itself helps to form the
partition, or ‘‚screen of resting before and after seeing. . . a punctuation in
which the eyes reconstitute for themselves the frame, the screen, the horizon of
vision‛(Irigaray 1984, 161) ’ (Boetzes 2010, 109).
Regarding this partition as a realization of the threshold where the subject
meets the world, I return to Russon’s conception of mood. Utilizing his
formulation, one’s way of relating to the world through mood is always colored
by being in a mood. Irigaray’s proposal of the need for distance from the other,
developed through the use of elementals, is based on an idea similar to Russon’s
conception of the difficulty of apprehending one’s mood while continually
remaining situated within it. Because one perceives and relates to the world, and
to mood, from within them, Irigaray’s screen emphasizes the necessity of
considering this juxtaposition of self to world. Without recognition of this
relation, the subject does not open to the other’s, or to the world’s unique way of
being and risks incorporating its essence from an outside perspective, or utilizing
it in a negatively dualistic manner.
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The idea of the screen suggests that, if one creates distance between itself
as subject and other, this distance will provide the space necessary for the other
to express its distinctive qualities and to speak for itself. This space also allows
the subject to be open and to hear what the other manifests and communicates in
its own unique mode. Following this distancing, this retraction, it is then
possible to ‚gather back‛ a more genuine perception of the other in order to form
an authentic intimate and communicative relationship with it on more mutually
beneficial terms (Boetzkes 2010, 108).
Additionally, Irigaray’s concept of the partition brings forth ‚a sense of
alterity‛ that is expressed through the approach to material form, especially
through elementals, utilized in some contemporary art (Boetzkes 2010, 109).
These contemporary genres, Boetzkes states, bring forth the use of retraction
within perception, as well as radicalize the senses. These modes of discernment,
she asserts, provide a specific type of non-instrumental ethical relationship that
can be formed with the earth by developing an aesthetic based on the use of
elementals (Boetzkes 2010, 109).
For instance, in Dennis Oppenheim’s earth art performance, ‚Reading
Position for Second Degree Burn,‛ the use of elementals created a relationship
between artist and earth, one which the viewer could take part in through its
photo documentation. By lying in the sun with an opened book covering part of
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his skin, the sunlight burned all but a white square where the book had been
(Boetzkes 2010, 50). Through this artistic performance, Oppenheim located his
body at the threshold between the elements of light and earth, using its passive
receptivity to create the art and the relationship between himself and the earth
(Boetzkes 2010, 50). Though Oppenheim sensed the elemental of light through
the heat against his skin, it nonetheless remained intangible to him and to later
viewers. Furthermore, by utilizing the passive play of elementals on his body,
rather than actively forming an art object, Oppenheim discovered an openness of
sense engendered by his bodily contact with the elementals (Boetzkes 2010, 50).
Some earth art, as well as some of Maya Lin’s works, with their use of
light, feeling, and touch, open art’s ‚boundaries to the infinite horizon of the
earth and other elementals‛ that meet one at the bodily threshold of existence
(Boetzkes 2010, 110). Through artworks of this type, which draw upon the
elemental, the nature/culture dualism is undermined. This genre undercuts this
type of dualism because rather than working with the elementals to dominate
them and to create human cultural products that are distant from nature, earth
artists allow the function of elementals to speak through their works as
substances that escape reducibility to human signification. In this way, ‚the
elemental is the condition for the freedom of thinking that allows a sense of the
other‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 110). Because one is unable to exceed the limit of the
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elemental, the individual encounters the other ‚face-to-face‛ in the sense that the
relationship between subject and object comes through responsiveness to and
awareness of ‚the other’s difference.‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 148-49). This ‘face-to-face’
type of encounter forms the basis of ‚ethical acknowledgment‛ because it avoids
reducing the other within a representational form (Boetzkes 2010, 149 and 148).
Boetzkes believes that if one is considering the way in which art ‚forges a
contact with the alterity of the earth,‛ it is important to understand the
relationship between art and the sublime (Boetzkes 2010, 110). The sublime is
that quality that inspires wonder and intense emotion through its overpowering
and incalculable nature. For Kant, it constituted a particular type of experience,
encompassing pain and pleasure engendered by the threshold where limitless
reason and ‚the limits of the imagination‛ converged (Boetzkes 2010, 109).
Somewhat related to Kant’s formulation, Irigaray’s view of the sublime comes
from the sense of wonder emerging from the partition between the self and the
other (Boetzkes 2010, 109). Elementals give a sense of this limit by separating the
self from the other, which cannot be subsumed, or in Plumwood’s terms, cannot
be incorporated.
It is at the juncture of the ‚dramatic overflow of sense‛ where the other
cannot be grasped that the sublime occurs. Here, thought liberates itself from
representation (Boetzkes 2010, 109). These components of sense and elementals,
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as ‚dimensions of the other as sublime,‛ furthermore, continue to undermine the
dualism ‚between sensibility and intelligibility‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 109). They
undercut dualisms because one cannot reduce the personal (or artistic)
experience of them to pure thought or to pure sense perception. Creating a
discourse between the subject and the material and irreducible nuances of the
other, including the earth, elementals help an individual locate the sublime at the
point where one senses and experiences ‚the sensation of the fading of the
sensible‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 109). Thus, like Japanese philosophy’s awareness of the
‘background’, as that from which form emanates, the irreducible elementals
create a means for viewing the earth with a sense of awe.
Irigaray’s view of self and other emphasizes the delineation between the
two that the integrity world orientation supports. Within both, there is a clear
distinction between self and other, unlike the intimacy orientation’s blurring of
them. However, while her approach supports the importance of fully
acknowledging difference, hers is an ethically aware view of difference that
avoids the subordinating elements inherent in negative dualisms. In one sense,
then, her approach opposes much of Asian philosophy in which the ‘gap’
between self and other ideally is closed within a sense of continuity. This
continuity is expressed through the Japanese approach that inspires a subject to
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strive toward total absorption with the object, the ultimate goal being the unified
existence of subject and object.
In contrast, Irigaray asserts that the distance between subject and object,
and the elementals that form the threshold between them by allowing them to be
sensed, are the bases of a positive ethical stance. As Boetzkes states, ‚the only
way to support this otherness and forge a path of communicability and intimacy
is via the subject’s separation and gathering back‛ (Boetzkes 2010, 108). Both
Irigaray’s approach to the relationship between the subject and object and that of
Japanese philosophy, however, utilize intense engrossment with the expression
of the other, and ultimately advance the same goal, that of awareness and
acceptance of the other in a more sophisticated intersubjective ethical
relationship.
Oliver further states that Irigaray calls on the ‚insistence of material
elements, especially air‛ as a way of redefining relationships that are dependent
on other elements, sometimes unseen ones (Boetzkes 2010, 126). The alienation
‘from the earth or others by an abyss is the product of what Irigaray calls the
’‛forgetting of air (Irigaray 1999 *1983+)‛’ (Oliver 2007, 127). Quoting Irigaray,
Oliver states that ‚*r+emembering air and the density of air reminds me that I am
both connected to and different from those around me‛ (Oliver 2007, 127). For
Irigaray, then, ‚the density of air connects and separates everything on earth‛
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and points to a sophisticated perception of materiality and interdependence
(Oliver 126). This ‚remembering air,‛ in some ways, mirrors the concept within
Japanese arts that Carter calls gesturing
toward the infinite depth in the background of the foreground object of
art in question: it is a calling to attention, a turning of the mind and heart
toward the unseen and eternal inexhaustibility of ultimate reality.
(Carter 2008, 52)
This background is ‚a great formless reservoir of potential and actual forms. . .
where the formless self-manifests as form, and eternity now expresses itself in
time,‛ and reveals, through the possibility of art, ‚a glimpse of the whole of
which it is an expression in this moment‛ (Carter 2008, 52). The background, like
the function of elementals as things that can exceed or engulf perception, hints at
the irreducibility of the earth/world and the other. Through an artist’s utilization
of elementals, the artist and viewer can experience a sensible relation to the earth,
while qualities and elements of the world can remain sublime, intangible, and
undisclosed. Like the depths of the background from which objects and forms
emanate, elementals create a ‚condition for the freedom of thinking that allows a
sense of the other‛ because they are based on holistic experience rather than
dualistic habits (Boetzkes 2010, 110). This freedom of thinking, could be called
openness.
Interdisciplinary thinker and geographer, Yi-Fu Tuan, suggests that art
can be utilized to reconceptualize relationships to others by realizing the vastness
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of all that the world presents. In the quotation that follows, Tuan highlights the
way that individuals unfortunately narrow their perception from all that
experience entails. He contends that art can illuminate elements of life that could
be seen as constituting the background because they are generally unexpressed,
or difficult to express. By opening one’s perspective, these artistic practices can
allow for holistic attunement to the background and to others. For instance, by
utilizing elementals that represent substances generally unacknowledged or
unappreciated fully, one fosters sensitivity and new levels of awareness. These
concepts support the use of art to develop the perspective on intersubjectivity
that Irigaray, care ethics, and strands of Asian philosophy strive to develop.
Tuan says,
There is far more to experience than those elements we choose to attend
to. In large measure, culture dictates the focus and range of our
awareness. Languages differ in their capacity to articulate areas of
experience. Pictorial art and rituals supplement language by depicting
areas of experience that words fail to frame . . . Art makes images of
feeling so that feeling is accessible to contemplation and thought.
(Tuan 1977, 148)
Fostering qualities for interacting positively with objects of experience becomes a
‘way of being’ that embodied artistic practices develop. The concept of
embodiment possesses many nuances. Drawing from various philosophical
disciplines in what follows, I attempt to formulate a particular working
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understanding of embodiment, of its role in artistic practices, and of the way that
it informs ethics related to these artistic practices.
Generally, ‘to embody’ is to infuse concrete or corporeal objects with noncorporeal elements such as thoughts and ideas. I assert, however, that
embodiment is not the uni-directional integration of a mental or spiritual quality
within a physical presence. While embodiment generally includes integrating
what are seen as non-physical elements, like thought, into bodily forms, it is
more productive and incorporating than that description entails. Within much
Eastern philosophy, the mind and the body are, at least originally, one, but may
come to need reunification (Carter 2008, 10). Embodiment, then, can be
considered the unification, or reunification of mind and body that leads one to
find one’s ‚deeper self, its spontaneous abilities and its connection to the greater
cosmos,‛ including nature (Carter 2008, 11).
Though artistic practices vary greatly from discipline to discipline, there
are some fundamental embodied practices that appear to span them, as well as
some fundamental traits that they engender. These practices and traits run
counter to the dualistic traits that have a negative ethical impact on
environmental and intersubjective relationships. They include specific,
physically-based modes and formulations of the acts of ‚seeing,‛ of connecting
the unconscious to the conscious, of defamiliarizing perceptions by habituating
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creative imagination or ‘artistic intuition’ (Deutsch 1996, 16), and of playing with
particular ideas and materials. Within the experience of each of these practices, a
more open and expansive view of the possibility of others as deserving of ethical
concern develops, as well as greater awareness and intersubjectivity in
relationships signifying elements of care.
‚Seeing‛ engenders self-reflective, attentive perception to elements of
reality that may be taken for granted in everyday interaction. Connecting the
unconscious to the conscious allows for deeply felt responses and spontaneous
reactions to entities, to concepts, and to the self. Through various defamiliarizing
techniques within creative imagining, openness to unique relationships and
connections often occurs. Finally, embodied free play allows one to interact with
and appreciate ideas and materials holistically. All of these actions, I believe, can
help overcome dualistic patterns of thought.
The Metamorphosis of ‚Seeing‛ and Transformation of Self
‚Deepening our way of being-in-the-world‛ (Ghilardi, 146)
‚To begin to see differently is to begin to act differently and to be different‛
(Carter 2008, 15).
As Val Plumwood states in a passage relating to dualistic modes of
environmental thought, ‚*s+ystematic devaluation and denial are perceptually
ingrained in backgrounding, involving systematic not noticing, not seeing‛
(Plumwood 1993, 69-70). The following discussion reinforces the implication of
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Plumwood’s statement by explaining how the embodied practice of ‚seeing‛
counters dualistic effects of the practice of backgrounding. In Marcello
Ghilardi’s comparative philosophical essay, ‚Between Aesthetics and Ethics: The
Experience of Seeing in Nicholas Cusanus and Nishida Kitaro,‛ he explains the
concept of ‚seeing‛ through the work of these two philosophers from divergent
Eastern and European traditions.
Through this inquiry, Ghilardi highlights some elements of what I
consider to be the seeds of artistic practices that engender a less dualistic, more
relational ethics. The idea of ‘seeing’ appears to be the first step into the realm of
intersubjectivity, the ‚concern‛ and ‚loving consciousness‛ that Eliot Deutsch
considers the manifestation of creativity. In their philosophies, Cusanus and
Nishida investigated ‚learning how to see,‛ where ‘seeing’ was considered to be a
form of ‘intelligere’, or of ‚being-in-the-world‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 140). This specific
mode of ‚seeing‛ functions as the basis for forming a relationship with the world
based on awareness and sensitivity since it refines perception and awareness
through receptiveness to the other. Like the holistic understanding fostered by
elementals, ‚seeing‛ develops a fuller sense of the other.
Through his comparison of the perspectives of Cusanus and Nishida,
Ghilardi develops the concept of ‘seeing’ as a creative activity that relates
individual, ‚pure experience,‛ through an organic process, with universal reality
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(Ghilardi 2008, 144). For Ghilardi, then, ‚seeing is a way of taking part in the
world. . . penetrating it not only by reason but also by the senses‛ (Ghilardi
2008, 144).
‘Seeing’, therefore, is a metaphor and means for holistic responsiveness
and attentiveness. While categorically encompassing corporeal elements, it
might entail sensory activities other than literal ‘seeing’—such as hearing or
touching. In fact, Carter states that ‘*a+rt lifts each person who responds, who
‚hears,‛ to a new level of awareness and possibility, to a renewed level of living
and acting’ (Carter 2008, 53). This level of awareness avoids a gaze that does not
acknowledge the other and that therefore leads to a solipsistic world view.
Instead, it transforms an individual and inspires a less fragmented or
reductionist understanding of existence, in which elements that are normally
dualistically separated, like time/eternity, formed/formless, and part/whole, can
be seen as connected and can be seen in a healthy ethical relation to each other
(Carter 2008, 53).
According to Carter, Nishida asserts that the element of Japanese culture
of ‚moving from the subject to the object‛ allows for empathy between the two
(Carter 2008, 63). While this may encompass ‚empty*ing+ the self and see*ing+
things,‛ it often comes from engaging in a dialogue with, and ‚hearing‛ what
others have to say as well (‚plants and stones‛ in the example on landscape
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gardening that Carter lays out) (Carter 2008, 63). Because ‘seeing’ in this account
is actually perceptive awareness, rather than mere everyday vision, I contend
that it is fundamental within artistic creative practices that engage earth others in
a dialogue.
Ghilardi asserts that through ‘seeing’, thus understood, the ‘‛self‛’ and the
world at large return to an original ‚ethical relation‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 141) since
this type of ‚*s+eeing is carefulness and attention to what is in the world‛ that ‚is
broader than individual feeling.‛ As the act of ‚caring, paying attention to, and
learning to behave in a new way,‛ Ghilardi, therefore, considers ‘seeing’ to be an
ethical activity focusing on relating to another in a non-instrumental way, one
that fosters more awareness of the other’s qualities and caring concern for its
needs. (Ghilardi 2008, 141, 144). Again, this formulation resonates with elements
of care ethics, including the concept of engrossment with the other that leads to
an empathy, an understanding, and ultimately to a caring relation to the other.
One of the ways in which Ghilardi explains the ethical nature of ‚seeing‛
as an activity is by showing how it undermines mind/body and individual/world
dualisms that prevent empathic relationships between individuals (Ghilardi
2008, 141-42). Beginning with Cusanus’ interpretation of divine vision in which
‚seeing is creating,‛ Ghilardi reasons that ‚seeing‛ can uncover relationships
with those outside oneself—both other humans and ‚transcendent Other*s+‛
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(Ghilardi 2008, 141-42). I believe that this concept of seeing often begins with
minute material elements within the world like the effect on the artist or viewer
of the reflective quality of polished stone of which architect/sculptor Maya Lin
speaks, or the awareness of the varying shades of green representing new plant
growth. Artworks, as expressions, as well as self-contained worlds in
themselves, provide a ground on which to form this type of awareness, as well as
an understanding of inherent relations between elements. For example,
regarding the empathic elements of her artworks, Lin states,
A direct empathy exists between the artwork and the viewer. These
works rely on a physical or empathetic response rather than on a learned
one from the viewer in order to be understood—or, more accurately, felt.
(Lin 2000, 2:03)
‚Seeing‛ as perceptive awareness, is the basis for creating this empathic
relationship between art and viewer.
By contrasting two Japanese terms related to ‚seeing,‛ Ghilardi explains
intentionality, or the way one directs consciousness toward something. One
interpretation of intentionality, omozashi, is communicative, while the other,
manazashi, is unidimensional—or what Plumwood might call monological,
discounting the expression of the other. Ghilardi states that ‚[o]mozashi is what is
seen by the other and, at the same time, what sees itself, and also, maybe, what
sees itself as an other. (Sakabe 1999, 244)‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 142). These terms,
therefore, represent two opposing ways of functioning in relation to others.
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As a discursive means of relating, omozashi engenders a stance toward
others that is similar to Plumwood’s intentional recognition stance, which I laid
out earlier, where the other is seen as possessing its own distinct form of
existence and worth that is not reducible to the subject’s, often human,
signification. Rather than imposing one’s perception of a thing onto it in a onesided way, as manazashi might do, omazashi fosters receptivity to what the other
has to say by realizing elements of interrelation and overlap between self and
other. This use of omazashi expresses a context for intentionality toward another
that is interactive, reciprocal, and mutually interdependent, and I would add, a
realization of ethical value within another (Ghilardi 2008, 142). So, like
elementals in Irigaray’s ethics of alterity, omazashi allows, fundamentally, for the
existence of an other. Additionally, it allows for mutual receptivity between self
and other, as well as recognition—seeing the self in the other—and the natural
empathy and kinship that follows from relating to others as if they were a
respected part of the self.
Carter, moreover, categorizes ‚pure experience‛ as akin to ‚unmediated
seeing,‛ or a form of ‚non-dual experience‛ that opposes traditional Western
philosophical lines of thought (Carter 2008, 119). These forms of ‘seeing’ and of
‚pure experience‛ are the ‘seeing’ that is ‚prior to the dualistic distinctionmaking of the intellect, and . . . intuits things as they are in their depths, in
85

themselves, rather than comparatively‛ (Carter 2008, 119). This openness that
precludes habitual categorization of others and makes possible a new
experiential awareness of them, is a basis for creating works of art that revitalize
awareness and lead to authentic care, care based on a deeper attunement to the
other.
Ghilardi states that Nishida conceives ‚seeing‛ as a process of personal
metamorphosis (Ghilardi 2008, 142). Because for Nishida ‚*s+eeing is a definite
form of experience, distinct from ordinary, superficial visual perception,‛ it
constitutes ‚pure experience,‛ weakening the dualism of ‚strong‛ subject
opposing ‚wholly external object.‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 142). This form of experience,
therefore, allows an individual to reformulate his/her relationship to others
(Ghilardi 2008, 142). ‚Pure experience‛ is direct experience. ‚Seeing,‛ Nishida
further asserts, is a ‚dynamic relation,‛ that precludes reduction of a subject to a
fixed essence. Nishida says,
‚I came to realize that it is not that experience exists because there is an
individual, but that an individual exists because there is an experience. I
thus arrived at the idea that experience is more fundamental than
individual difference (Nishida 1990, XXX.)‛
(Ghilardi 2008, 142)
‛Seeing,‛ as pure experience, therefore, reveals the continuity of existence
between object and subject and functions as ‘‛acting intuition‛. . . ‚movement
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and relationship‛ that engender the ‚encounter of subject and object‛ (Ghilardi
2008, 142).
‚Seeing,‛ then, provides a means of personal transformation and of
opening ‘to the ‚other‛’ (Ghilardi 2008, 152). The openness engendered by
‚seeing‛ fosters the ‘‛between‛’ of human existence, that ‚continuity of
discontinuity‛ that ‚shapes the forms of life as they affect our relationship to
others, our identity and our difference‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 152). That is, though
distinctions exist between entities, so do interdependence and overlap. Ghilardi
maintains that while ‚seeing involves the senses,‛ the perceptual level leads to
one deeper than the sensual surface, a level that is ‚one with the profundity‛ it
conceals (Ghilardi 2008, 146). This profundity may encompass Japanese
philosophy’s background, or the sublime that stems from the overflowing sense
of perception fostered by awareness of the elemental. As John Dewey states,
[t]he sensible surface of things is never merely a surface. One can
discriminate rock from flimsy tissue-paper by the surface alone, so
completely have the resistances of touch and the solidities due to stresses
of the entire muscular system been embodied in vision.
(Dewey 1934, 30)
Dewey’s statement suggests that the literal, quotidian act of ‘seeing’ is a means of
accessing a deeper attunement to things that ‘seeing’ as perception entails. In
this formulation, awareness does not end with the seen surface of objects, rather,
it correlates with it as the first step of understanding another. Having
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experienced the world in a bodily way, a simple visual recognition of something
like the rock, in Dewey’s example, is a sign for a whole range of qualities
associated with it. Perception within art may also utilize this quotidian
recognition to call on a deeper, more sublime experience of an object or idea.
For example, with religion as his paradigm for transformation through
‚seeing,‛ Ghilardi argues that at the ‚highest levels of refinement and
authenticity,‛ ‚*p+oetic and artistic inspiration transform‛ (Ghilardi 2008, 146).
Therefore, art ‚surpasses all form even though it works with form‛ (Ghilardi
2008, 146). Within art, form and imagination rely on each other intrinsically
(Deutsch 1996, 16). Artistic expression is intertwined with artistic imagination
and intuition and often the two are formed interdependently through the
practice of physically creating a form, which in turn is influenced by ‘seeing’ as
perception.
Finally, Ghilardi states that by liberating and varying ‚rigid notions of
identity‛ and ‚cultural and intellectual habits of thought,‛ artistic practices
utilizing ‚seeing‛ can open individual and relational experience to the diversity
and richness of experience in what appears to be an anti-reductionist mode of
being (Ghilardi 2008, 153). This liberation is a means of altering those automatic
instrumental uses of things that come from everyday habituation grounded in
cultural norms.
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By focusing on the physical materials, and utilizing the special mode of
perceptive ‘seeing’, one avoids taking others for granted based on abstracted
views. For example, the difference in appreciation of the Husky breed of dog,
will be quite different if one reads a book about it, or one interacts with one. You
could read the fact that each piece of fur on its body possesses three distinct
levels or layers, each one providing a different type of protection from the
elements—heat retention, water resistance, etc. However, if you perceive and
engage with the fur—seeing and feeling it physically understanding its relation
to the activities of an actual dog, you will have a much fuller awareness of it.
In summary, ‘seeing’ as perception, could be accomplished through any
type of sensory bodily encounter. As ‚pure experience‛ it comes before much of
the mediation of other ways of relating to others. It is a dynamic, receptive mode
of thought and feeling that allows one to foster empathy and concern for its
objects. Within artistic practices, furthermore, it seems to bring about new ways
of relating to others, often through play.
Play
When discussing what he calls, ‚the evolutionary value of play,‛ in his
book Free Play: Improvisation in Life and Art, Stephen Nachmanovitch states
that play ‚fosters richness of response and adaptive flexibility‛ (Nachmanovitch,
43). Play is ‚the free spirit of exploration‛ that manifests ‚fresh, interactive ways
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of relating with people, animals, things, ideas, images, ourselves‛
(Nachmanovitch 1990, 43). Nachmanovitch sees play as an intrinsically
satisfying activity, which focuses ‚on process, not product‛ (Nachmanovitch
1990, 45), and therefore, also acknowledges the importance of practice, if not,
over theory, then at least, used in tandem with it. In terms of breaking down
dualisms, play challenges ‚social hierarchies,‛ develops relationships and
unites ‚elements that were formerly separate,‛ allows for novel sequencing of
actions, reinterpretations of relating, and the ability ‚to rearrange our capacities
and our very identity so that they can be used in unforeseen ways‛
(Nachmanovitch 1990, 43).
For nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Schiller, play was a
way to re-create and reiterate the character of the individual by unifying feeling
and thinking (Schiller 2004, 66-67). Art, the aesthetic, was the means for
achieving the state of play, the play impulse, for Schiller, since art would imbue
feeling/nature with form and add a sensual element to form/rationality (Schiller
2004, 60-84). By bringing harmony to the individual through the play impulse,
the individual gained the ability to free itself from constraint and inhibition and
to develop a ‚free disposition‛; morality could become more nuanced by
incorporating sensory and intuitive elements; and individuals’ capacities to
foster harmony with the community would evolve due to Beauty’s public
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function to confer on one ‚a social character‛ through a form of communication
that unites society (Schiller 2004, 99, 138). In this aesthetic State, all would be free
citizens with equal rights (Schiller 2004, 140).
In this way, following the influence of an idealized ancient Greek notion
in which humanity was based in nature, and culture was un-segmented and
encompassed harmony, Schiller sought to imbue everyday life and work with
Beauty and create a level of humanity above the realm of the mechanistically
ordered political one (Schiller 2004, 38). By following the Greek example, Schiller
intended to unify the material and the rational, and wrote of the Greeks:
‚*h+owever high Reason might soar, it always drew its subject matter lovingly
after it‛ (Schiller 2004, 38). This ‘semblance’, for Schiller, would not deceive, but
only enrich and authenticate humanity and the self (Schiller 2004, 38). Art’s
process, for Schiller, the play impulse, and its product—Beauty, with its public
communicative function, transformed the individual by bringing feeling and
thinking together in a sense of inner freedom in order to create a morality that
would be developed naturally and habitually through art encompassing ‚a
delight in appearance, a disposition towards ornament and play‛ (Schiller 2004,
125, 60-140).
A predominant element of creative artistic play that transforms the artist
and the viewer encompasses fostering the possibility of relating to others in a less
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reductionist and more open way. Using practices, like play, that include bodily
and holistic elements can break habits based on dualisms that exclude these
elements when relating to others. As the next section shows, play is a way of
blurring the line between conscious and unconscious and can bring together
elements from both realms of thought in a dynamic configuration.
Conscious and Unconscious
Maya Lin’s Holistic Embodied Engagement
‚I think with my hands‛ (Lin 2000, 3:09).
In the Chapter, ‚On Making,‛ in Maya Lin’s book Boundaries, Lin
discusses her process for developing her designs. Her method, which includes a
type of free play, marries conscious and unconscious elements, with results that
often create a profound and holistic effect on the viewer. Beginning by writing
about a project, Lin attempts to articulate the ‘goal’ of the work (Lin 2000, 3:05).
Instead of envisioning a particular incarnation of an idea, she allows herself to
ponder the reason for the work, often commissioned for a particular person or
group and specific to a particular physical site (Lin 2000, 3:05).
Though unsure at this point in the process whether it will ultimately be
useful in the final design, Lin researches the physical and cultural aspects of a
work’s site. For two memorial designs, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and the
Civil Rights Memorial, the research done before designing them, states Lin,
presented her with a ‚general direction‛ that, in both instances, she would
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ultimately take (Lin 2000, 3:05-3:07). The ideas she took with her when she
visited these sites helped her to ‚imagine almost instantly the form each
memorial would take‛ (Lin 2000, 3:07).
After initially visiting a site, she returns to her studio with the experience
of the visit ‚in the back of her mind‛ (Lin 2000, 3:07). Not knowing what she is
seeking yet, she avoids focusing ‚too directly or self-consciously on the search
for an idea for the artwork. . . and rarely arrive[s] at an idea by consciously
sitting down at a desk and trying to figure out what‛ to do (Lin 2000, 3:07). She
makes models instantaneously stating ‚I cannot force a design; I do not see this
process as being under my conscious control. It is a process of percolation, with
the form eventually finding its way to the surface‛ (Lin 2000, 3:07).
She considers her creative process as a balance between analytic study
based on her research, and ‚in the end, a purely intuited gesture‛ (Lin 2000,
3:09). Regarding the large outdoor landscape sculpture, ‚Wave Field,‛ she states
that she ‚finally realized that I would not understand it or be able to predict if
the form would work until I built it at its actual scale‛ (Lin 2000, 3:13). Clearly,
her process of making is an artistic practice that is embodied and holistic, using
elements of kokoro—Japanese mind/heart, conscious verbal and analytic
reasoning, emotional and intuitive components, all intermingled with actual
physical modeling and building.
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The purpose of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial for Lin, was ‚accepting
and coming to terms with a loved one’s death‛ (Lin 2000, 4:09). This work is an
example of an artist ‚seeing‛ and responding to numerous contextual elements:
a physical site, a powerful idea, a vulnerable audience, and varied physical
materials. Maya Lin’s response to these elements is a graceful illustration of an
individual artist following a lifelong ‚Way,‛ or path to form ethically caring
relationships. Her initial ‚seeing‛ and response to the site where the memorial
would exist inspired her design. She ‚had a simple impulse to cut into the earth.
. . and imagined taking a knife and cutting into the earth, opening it up, an
initial violence and pain that in time would heal‛ (Lin 2000, 4:10). Reflecting on
her creation, she states,
I always saw the wall as pure surface, an interface between light and
dark, where I cut the earth and polished its open edge. The wall
dematerializes as a form and allows the names to become the object, a
pure and reflective surface that would allow visitors the chance to see
themselves with the names. I do not think I thought of the color black as a
color, more as the idea of a dark mirror into a shadowed mirrored image
of the space, a space we cannot enter and from which the names separate
us, an interface between the world of the living and the world of the
dead.
(Lin 2000, 4:14)
As Dewey asserts, what is evoked in the act of expression, is not merely a
discharge of emotion, but, rather ‚is qualitative, a transformation of energy into
thoughtful action through assimilation of meanings from the background of past
experiences‛ (Dewey 1934, 63). In this way, these stored experiences are
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‚revived‛ through ‚resistance from surroundings . . . that generates curiosity
and solicitous care‛ and allows for the awareness of the self (Dewey 1934, 62).
Lin’s memories and stored experiences included many elements—her formal
training, her exposure to nature and to modeling clay in her childhood, her
intuitive approach to the sensitivity of building a memorial, and even the social
obstacles of being a young Asian woman attempting to build the memorial for a
war fought against Asians. Lin’s responses to the project were imbued with
particular understandings coming from them. She integrated particular elements
into the memorial based on the interactions between her goals and the challenges
posed by her stored experiences.
The resistance that Dewey speaks of resembles Irigaray’s ‚screen of
resting‛ that acknowledges the alterity of elementals. Both concepts involve
sensing the distinctness of the environmental factors and allowing an individual
to integrate them into his or her ‘way of being’ in a productive way. For Dewey,
therefore, it is the integration of ‚the natural and the cultivated‛ in ‚acts of social
intercourse‛ that exist as art (Dewey 1934, 65).
Therefore, an authentic artwork, for Dewey, possesses specific elements.
It is ‚a construction in time;‛ it is brought out of the artist through objective
pressures working on ‚natural impulses and tendencies;‛ and it utilizes ‚the
interaction of organic and environmental conditions and energies‛ to fashion ‚an
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integral experience‛ (Dewey 1934, 67). The element of time highlights the
ephemeral, changing quality of the context to which each individual relates. Art
is created in time, as well, and the moment of engagement in the creation of a
work can encompass the serendipitous integration of conscious and unconscious
within the flow of time, as well as the understanding of one’s relation to the
other and to the universal, as well.
As Maya Lin’s creative process emphasizes, both the external physical
materials used to form the artwork, and the artist’s ‘‛inner‛ materials, images,
observations, memories and emotions’ undergo change (Dewey 1934, 77).
Important for intersubjective ethics, with the imagining and placement of
physical materials, the artist’s ‚ideas and feelings are also ordered‛ (Dewey 1934,
78):
[T]he physical process develops imagination, while imagination is
conceived in terms of concrete material. Only by progressive organization
of ‚inner‛ and ‚outer‛ material in organic connection with each other can
anything be produced that is not a learned document or illustration of
something familiar.
(Dewey 1934, 78)
Because artistic practices as described by Dewey are more than a one-sided
transformation of materials by the artist, but in fact, often exist as a means for
profound transformation of the artist related to materials, these practices
counteract the traits that negatively affect the environment. Artistic materials
and ideas are inspired by elements of world.
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Artists work with physical materials in ways that discover their physical
limits, including the ways that they can be used, as well as the entities and ideas
that they can represent, or relate to. Often through the ‚pure experiences‛ of
seeing, playing, and creating, new, personal, yet universally grounded meanings
can come to be associated with these substances. Since these ingredients are of
the real world, forming sensitive relationships to them and between them fosters
new perceptions that allow entities to have more than instrumental meaning.
Therefore, dualisms, discontinuity, reductionism, and colonization maintain less
of a grip on one’s view toward the other.
In the next segment, I discuss another way in which art establishes a sense
of openness between the artist, or the audience, and the subjects of a work. Being
entrenched within a habitualized view of an entity often precludes awareness of
one’s ethical stance toward it. The possibility of deliberating about how one
perceives another ethically is taken for granted if one lacks a sense of openness.
A destabilizing, defamiliarizing view of objects and elements within the world,
can help to awaken a sense of openness. In what follows, by utilizing poetic
writing as an example, I trace a view of the art of poetry that asserts that it is a
means of reinvigorating perceptions that take elements of the world for granted.
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Poetic Art—Defamiliarization and Awareness of the Other
William Carlos Williams, ‚The Locust Tree in Flower‛
Though poetry is often recorded in writing, as American Poet Laureate,
Robert Pinsky states, at its heart, ‚poetry is a vocal, which is to say a bodily, art‛
with its medium being ‚a human body‛ (Pinsky 1998, 8). Furthermore, the body
is not that of an expert, but rather that of the audience (or the poet can be his own
audience): ‚*t+he reader’s breath and hearing embody the poet’s words‛ making
the ‚art physical, intimate, vocal, and individual‛ (Pinsky 1998, 8). It utilizes the
intellect and the body holistically, and, Pinsky argues, for ‚specific uses,‛ for
holding ‚things in memory,‛ for expressing ‚feelings and ideas rapidly and
memorably,‛ and for communicating all these things with others (Pinsky 1998,
9).
In the chapter, ‚Mallarmé and Valéry and the Essence of Poetry,‛ from his
book Essays on the Nature of Art, Eliot Deutsch utilizes Wallace Fowlie’s
particular interpretation of Mallarmé’s views on poetry. Fowlie asserts that
‘‛The meaning of a poetic work is inseparable from its structure‛’ (Deutsch 1996,
42). According to Deutsch, therefore, ‚*t+he language of a poem, which cannot
be changed or paraphrased, is its meaning‛ (Deutsch 1996, 42). By pursuing
some of the perspectives of Mallarmé and of Valéry, Deutsch concludes that
creating a poem ‘out of nothing’, as well as experiencing it on an aesthetic level,
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‚encompass all the cognitive insights and emotional responses traditionally
associated with religion‛ (Deutsch 1996, 42). Like religion, which is often seen as
an ephiphantic mechanism for opening to the sublime, one can feel a holistic
sense of awe when creating or experiencing a work of poetic art.
This creative process and the language of poetry, as opposed to holding a
mostly symbolic function, like religion, however, are autonomous, or selfgenerating (Deutsch 1996, 42). The quality of autonomy in art is its ability to
function with a value immanent to its intrinsic self-relations. That is, because a
poem or work of art can exist in a self-sufficient state, separate from its
relationship to the world, or to its inspiration, a poem may thoroughly reinvent
or reinterpret an idea or subject from the bounds of everyday habituation.
Further supporting this view of poetry, Terence Hawkes, in Structuralism and
Semiotics, writes that according to Russian formalist, Viktor Shklovsky, ‚the
essential function of poetic art is to counteract the process of habituation
encouraged by routine everyday modes of perception‛ (Hawkes 1977, 62). This
concept of ‘making strange’, or ostranenie, is based on the existence of literary
devices such as rhythm, meter, and ‚the use of sound. . . as a meaningful
element in its own right,‛ rather than as a mere representation of ‚sense‛ (as the
underlying meaning behind a signifier) (Hawkes 1977, 62).
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These defamiliarizing elements, often integral to poetic language, call to
mind the issues brought forth by Plumwood and Ghilardi regarding ‘seeing’.
The sense of poetry I proposed includes an understanding about awareness, in
the sense of ‘seeing’, and the lack of awareness coming from ‚routine everyday
modes of perception‛ similar to the concerns advanced by Plumwood regarding
dualisms and nature (Hawkes 1977, 62). For Plumwood, as previously stated,
systematic devaluation of ‘others’ involves systematically not ‘seeing’.
Regarding poetry, Hawkes advances Shklovsky’s opinion about losing insight,
stating,
We very readily cease to ‘see’ the world we live in, and become
anesthetized to its distinctive features. The aim of poetry is to reverse that
process, to defamiliarize that with which we are overly familiar. . .
(Hawkes 1977, 62)
The specific method used in poetic discourse calls attention to itself ‚as a
‘medium’ over and above the ‘message’ it contains‛ exceeding the conveyance of
information that occurs in regular discourse (Hawkes 1977, 63). In this way,
poetry cultivates awareness through a mechanism similar to Ghilardi’s concept
of ‘seeing’ as perceptive awareness. For Deutsch, the function and aspects of
poetry that elevate it above regular language allow it to ‚yield a pure musical
response‛ (Deutsch 1996, 42). For Shklovsky, according to Hawkes, the same
function and aspects help one (presumably a poet and/or his or her audience) to
locate a lost ‚childlike, non-jaded vision‛ (Hawkes 1977, 62):
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The poet thus aims to disrupt ‘stock responses’, and to generate a
heightened awareness: to restructure our ordinary perception of ‘reality’,
so that we end by seeing the world instead of numbly recognizing it: or at
least so that we end by designing a ‘new’ reality to replace the (no less
fictional) one which we have inherited and become accustomed to.
(Hawkes 1977, 62)
Two versions of the poem, ‚The Locust Tree in Flower,‛ by William
Carlos Williams, illustrate the way in which poetry can refresh one’s awareness
of the world. In its reinvention of elements of the natural world, particularly,
poetry can inspire new, empathic relationships with it in the place of the habitual
ones of denied dependency. Williams’ poems are particularly interesting when
seen as a set because the second version is more minimal, sparer, and less
directly descriptive of the locust tree. Both versions are themselves complete and
elegant poems that create a sort of portrait of a locust tree through the delicate
rhythm Williams creates with his novel use of line and verse breaks, as well as
his description of parts of the tree’s body and life-cycle. However, an
intensification of ostranenie stems from reading the first version and then the
second.
The Locust Tree in Flower
(First version)
Among
the leaves
bright
green
of wrist-thick
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tree
and old
stiff broken
branch
ferncool
swaying
loosely strung—
come May
again
white blossom
clusters
hide
to spill
their sweets
almost
unnoticed
down
and quickly
fall

The Locust Tree in Flower
(Second version)
Among
of
green
stiff
old
bright
broken
branch
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come
white
sweet
May
again
(Williams 1985 ed., 93-94)
I believe that by reading the first and then the second version of the poem
in order, the reader develops a ‘heightened awareness’, or receptiveness to the
idea of the locust tree as a unique intentional living being. The consequential
enhancement of the defamiliarization of the language resulting from reading the
poems in order is balanced by a feeling of familiarity, like déjà vu, stemming
from the similarities in the poems. This level of awareness is akin to a bodily
understanding and an emotional, even visceral, reaction to the idea of the tree
that is filtered through the self-contained, autonomous worlds of the poems’
unique language.
Native American writing is another example illustrating how poetry and
writing defamiliarize language in order to advance positive elements of
intersubjective ethics, awareness and care. Native American author Jeanette
Armstrong defamiliarizes English language by taking English words and using
them in ways that create more musical rhythms echoing N’silxchn language and
connecting it to particular rhythms of the land (Armstrong 1998, 192). Native
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American writing thus engages poet and reader with the language in a novel
way, drawing out possible relationships with the natural world. This
reinvention both maintains an imagination-based connection to the land and
allows for a freedom to use language in a way that counteract colonization
through a creative reinvention of identity. As Native American writer Elizabeth
Woody writes regarding Native tribes in Oregon, ‚*w+e maintain an intangible
connection to the land, people, and culture that is described and known as the
Voice of the Land‛ (Woody 1998, 153).
Through language that ‚emulates the land and the sky in its unique flow
around‛ one, an author can recreate the sensual responses to the land and
transmit meaning related to lost times within Native Americans’ cultural history
(Armstrong 1998, 180-81). The process of writing, therefore, allows natural
phenomena to speak to the authors, who ‚affirm the concept of a reciprocal
relationship with all things in Creation‛ through their works (Ortiz 1998, xv).
Jeannette C. Armstrong, in ‚Land Speaking, emphasizes ‚the significance
that original Native languages and their connection to our lands have in
compelling the reinvention of the enemy’s language for our perspectives as
indigenous writers‛ (Armstrong 1998, 175). This is a new way of looking at
language, land, and their relationships that is ethical because it avoids taking
language and land for granted by fostering awareness of their interdependence.
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These practices reflect an important point advanced by Edward Said, from
Culture and Imperialism, quoted in Postcolonial Ecologies, that ‚*i+f there is
anything that radically distinguishes the imagination of anti-imperialism, it is the
primacy of the geographical in it,‛ as a way to counteract ‚the loss of locality to
the outsider.‛ Said contends that, at first, ‚the land is recoverable only through
imagination,‛(Said 1993, 77, quoted in Deloughrey and Handley 2011, 3). Tuan,
Furthermore, asserts that ‚*h+omeland is an important type of place‛ and that
one’s connection, or attachment to it, is often intense (Tuan 1977, 149). He states
that,
Should destruction occur we may reasonably conclude that the people
would be thoroughly demoralized, since the ruin of their settlement
implies the ruin of their cosmos. Yet this does not necessarily happen.
Human beings have strong recuperative powers. Cosmic views can be
adjusted to suit new circumstances. With the destruction of one ‚center of
the world,‛ another can be built next to it . . .
(Tuan 1977, 149-50)
I believe that Said hints at this sense of recuperation through the
readjustment to place when he speaks of ‘recovery’ of the land. However, in
most instances of colonization, the land itself will not be recoverable, rather, the
‘adjustment’ of cosmic views of which Tuan speaks, has to take place by
developing new ways of relating to land—often through artistic imagination, like
that of Woody, Armstrong, and Hill.
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Next, I will summarize the points I have made thus far. Following that
brief summation, in the section on artistic engagement and activism, one of the
‚movements‛ I will discuss will deal with place, that of Native American’s
attempts to rediscover their identity and that of the land within their
communities and lives they lead—so affected by colonization.
Before discussing the possibilities that can come from incorporating
engaged artistic practice, or similar modes of practice, more prevalently into
daily life, I will sum up my argument thus far. In laying a foundation for my
paradigm, I first explained the particular Western historical tradition of dualistic
thought. Val Plumwood’s concise discussion of the aspects of dualisms and
several effects that they engender, often implicitly within culture, revealed how
those entrenched in these dualisms can, seemingly logically denigrate the natural
environment. Furthermore, the more closely associated with ‘non-rational
nature’ that a person or entity appears to be, the more justified the ‘master’
imagines itself to be in subordinating the other, within Plumwood’s model.
I also introduced Vandana Shiva’s interpretation of reductionism as a
means of illustrating the way that much of Western culture has come to see the
natural world as mere mechanizations to be controlled and ordered by
humanity. By distancing themselves from the natural world, as well as those
people who form more interdependent relationships with it, those who can,
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attempt to control nature in order to maximize profits. As Shiva’s work
supported, this is often done at the expense of the very functions that are
associated with elements of nature, a seed’s ability to reproduce naturally, for
instance. While these reductionist practices discount many elements of natural
systems in a myopic way, they also form means of controlling groups of people
who formerly had access to common natural resources.
While there is much evidence and thought to support a view of continuity
between nature and culture, traditional Western approaches, highlight elements
of discontinuity. Taking the continuity and interdependence of nature to culture
has costly consequences for earth others and humans’ future prospects. As
Sherry Ortner and John Dewey acknowledge, nature and culture exist in tandem,
and in fact, cannot actually be separated within the ‚real world.‛ Though this
continuity is often unacknowledged in the contemporary world, there is much
scientific support of its existence. Above and beyond these contentions, Dewey
asserts that the environment actually forms a vital part of all aspects of human
life—including—and, perhaps, especially, the artistic and sublime.
I separated colonization as a more explicit and active negative effect of
dualism, reductionism, and discontinuity, one that extends their effects more
blatantly to more groups of others—non-human and human alike. By providing
examples of the effects of colonizing actions, and relating their underlying basis
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to perspectives that are extremely dominant within contemporary Western
culture, I attempted to show how far-reaching both its patterns of thought and its
effects extend.
In the sections on alternative forms of power and care ethics, I attempted
to uncover some underlying elements of power and to tie them to dualisms.
Understanding some of the power bases for the dualistic negative traits affecting
intersubjective ethical relationships with others was a way to begin the
discussion on care ethics as a means of utilizing more positive relationships and
forms of power to advance ethical relationships. Ultimately, my goal was to tie
the underlying tenets of care ethics to lifelong engaged artistic practices in order
to work toward a similar ethical goal.
In discussing theory, application, and practice in relation to comparative
ethics, I attempted to show the Eastern philosophical roots for utilizing these
processes in a sequence that is the inverse from the contemporary Western
method. Forming a philosophical basis through the introduction of the intimacy
world orientation in order to make practice the initial and predominant aspect of
ethical decision making, I prepared the reader for the subsequent connection I
made between practice and engaged physical artistic practices within the section
that followed.
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In the section on the positive ethical effects of engaged physical artistic
practices, I laid out the four practices that I felt countered successfully the
negative traits that foster inattentiveness to the environment, specifically, and to
others, in general. I believe that because these practices foster involvement,
appreciation, and connection, or kinship between subject and object, they
affectively counteract the negative traits affecting the environment. Particular
bodily ways of ‘seeing’, connecting conscious and unconscious, utilizing free
play, and defamiliarizing the everyday perceptions leading to unawareness
constitute these positive methods and practices. ‘Seeing’, in my formulation, is
perceptive awareness, the basis of what care ethics considers ‚engrossment‛ with
the other, which entails hearing the other and understanding its needs.
Furthermore, by fostering perceptive awareness, underlying power relations that
create unquestioned cultural norms begin to come to light.
Since embodied artistic practices deal with physical elements that the
artist often models or becomes receptive to (in the case of earth art), opening
one’s perception is fundamental to these practices. When one’s perception is
open, a new attunement toward others is awakened in a shared process of
discovery that is a basis of the ethics of care. Since unawareness and reduction of
the other are major elements of dualist thought and the negative attitudes that it
fosters, ‘seeing’ is a powerful way to counteract them. For instance, perceiving
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things with the recognition that they have their own intentions, is the first step to
avoiding habits of instrumentalization, incorporation, and colonizing acts.
Play forms an extension of the attunement that is based on ‘seeing’. The
individual begins to develop an intuition about the differences and similarities of
others. The idea of continuity forms, not as a seamless harmony with others, but
as an experimental and experiential way of engaging with them in a true life
context. Play is a way of fully participating with elements of existence, and the
use of elementals, in particular, highlights those substances that are often taken
for granted, in a sense, giving them a voice. This marriage of conscious and
unconscious found through holistic creative play counteracts the nonparticipation of reductionism that Shiva explained as being so destructive to
earth others.
Using creativity to defamiliarize habitualized perceptions creates room for
newly realized thoughts to spring from the unconscious. The serendipity within
the creation of a work of art that allows unconsidered relationships to arrive and
be considered, can extend toward other entities as well—people, non-human
animals, the environment—that have been seen in a habitually reductive and
dualistic way. These artistic practices can form a lifelong ‚Way‛ of interacting
with things, elementals, and others. They make it possible to open oneself to
new ideas, and to the fullness that others have to offer. This understanding
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fosters an appreciation of the uniqueness of others of all types, and engenders a
mode of awareness and concern. In what follows, I try to bring the discussion
full circle, from the external to the internal aspects of the individual, to related
aspects and responses of another, to a group of others within the external world.
First, I flesh out some of the ways that creative practices connect to
activism through the example of the documentary film, ‚Blue Vinyl.‛ Then, I
will give three brief, introductory examples of artistic practices that have
connected groups into social ‚movements‛ that utilize an ethical component
similar to what one could call activism. The first is the way in which Native
American writing is active in cultural discourse. Second, is the presence of tikkun
olam in the work of the twentieth century Jewish American painter, Ben Shahn.
Third, is the dynamic relationship between folk music and the Civil Rights
movement.
IV. Affecting Others, Communal Practice, Activism
Activism through the Artistic Choices of Openness and Defamiliarizing
Humor in ‚Blue Vinyl‛
‚Art makes images of feeling so that feeling is accessible to contemplation and
thought‛ (Tuan 1977, 148).
While at first glance, art and activism may seem only tentatively related, if
at all, bearing in mind the preceding discussions of power, of intersubjectivity, of
care ethics, of practice, and particularly, of physically engaged artistic practice,
the relationship between them becomes more apparent. Consider that I
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advanced the concept of art as a mechanism for embodied ethical practice. The
term ‘activism’, includes the word ‘active’ within it, and utilizes action as a social
force. Merriam-Webster’s defines ‘activism’ as: ‚a doctrine or practice that
emphasizes direct vigorous action especially in support of or opposition to one
side of a controversial issue‛ (Merriam Webster). While many elements, or
forces, of power shape how one feels about an issue, as well as the action one
ultimately takes, actually performing ‚direct vigorous actions‛ of activism
appear to be another level of force within the many at work in Foucaultian
biopower.
Like the artistic practices and the ‚Ways,‛ activism engages one in a
holistic, contextual manner. Intellectual beliefs, visceral and emotional responses
to issues, and active, discursive interactions with other activists and the entities
that a movement addresses, encompass some of the practices of activism. The
discussion of artistic practices has focused on the way that these practices form a
basis for an individual and an audience to engage physically, directly, and
holistically with an element, idea, or an other in order to form a more
intersubjective, more positive, ethical relationship with it that engenders care.
Activism, like these practices, engages one in such a direct holistic way. That is
to say, an activist is compelled by a deep personal response to act in support of,
or against, an issue or cause similar to the integrated responses fostered by the
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‚Ways‛ and practices that relate artist and viewer to the other. Using art for
activism, therefore, can inspire the care that embodied artistic engagement
fosters and integrate it with the force of activism’s direct action in ‚support of or
in opposition to one side of a controversial issue‛ (Merriam-Webster).
Arlene Plevin unearths some crucial links between art and activism by
analyzing ‚Blue Vinyl,‛ Judith Helfand’s and Daniel Gold’s film documentary.
Her article clarifies some of the ways that elements of art and activism mutually
reinforce one another. ‚Blue Vinyl’s‛ documentary narrative follows Helfand’s
search for information about the safety of vinyl and its manufacturing process.
Helfand takes a simple act to begin her quest for knowledge about
environmental safety and justice: her parents decision to replace the dilapidated
wood on their home with ‚blue vinyl siding,‛ ‘‛embossed. . . with fake
woodprint‛’ (Plevin 2004, 226). The artistic choices that are used to develop the
story illustrate how art can foster the power of activism through the awareness
brought about by artistic ‘seeing’ and defamiliarization. This awareness can
stimulate an individual’s understanding of and empathy related to a situation
and prompt one to become involved with the embodied engagement in relation
to a cause, an involvement that defines activism.
Having suffered from cervical cancer due to her mother’s use of DES,
Diethylstilbestrol, when pregnant, Helfand is aware of latent and purposely
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concealed product dangers of which consumers are often unaware. One of
Helfand’s targets within the movie is the general lack of awareness that
commonly exists because ordinary products are used without consideration of
their human or environmental effects under the assumption that those who make
them will honor the consumer’s trust. She is concerned with the ‚unexamined
consumer ideologies‛ that readily accept as safe the products offered to them—
‚along with that perspective’s corresponding neglect and sacrifice of
economically powerless and usually invisible communities‛ (Plevin 2004, 226).
The devastating impact of DES on Helfand, Plevin suggests, has inspired
Helfand’s development of a personal perspective that represents a certain
holism, or continuity, between varying levels of her life experience. She sees
nature, as represented in the nature of her body, in continuity with external
stimuli, such as the pollution and toxicity related to vinyl’s manufacture and
existence. She relates her body and these stimuli to her position within her home
and her community, as well as within the larger global environment. In other
words, nature and culture are always in relation to one another, and the health of
both humans and the environment exists interdependently in correspondence for
her. The film provides a way to communicate her perspective through the
thought-provoking creative and artistic choices she makes. These choices
defamiliarize vinyl, a commonplace object of consumption, whose safety is
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normally left unquestioned. This stylistic approach allows viewers to reevaluate
the subject matter using their fresh, more informed intellectual and emotional
responses, garnered from deeper, more holistic perspectives.
Plevin describes the movie as ‚a blueprint for future endeavors‛ of
environmental activism (Plevin 2004, 227). The movie represents such a
blueprint because some of its important qualities foster ‚relationships that cross
class, race, and geography‛ (Plevin 2004, 227). Making intersubjective
relationships between entities more explicit, regardless of their differences, thus
exposing the interdependence of individuals and groups variously affected by an
ethical decision is one of the approaches of care ethics. By illustrating the
detrimental effects of vinyl on the environment and human health in a way that
links the viewer to the individuals suffering and to the detrimental
environmental effects helps create an empathic view of the effects of vinyl, one
that ‘objective’ facts alone, could not. For example, a more integrity-oriented
approach toward these issues of environmental justice might use ‘objective’ data
related to environmental effects on a particular group of individuals or natural
environment. By itself, that data would not inspire the same level of empathy as
a context related, artistically expressive perspective on the situation such as
Helfand’s.
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Since care ethics operates in a more contextual, personal, intimacyoriented way by engaging with those who are affected by a decision, it provides
a way to generate a deeper understanding and concern through activism.
Utilizing practice, in general, and artistic practices, specifically, activism can
respond to individuals and groups in a more caring way by engendering
emotional affect, and responsive sensitivity that can help guide one’s decisions,
incorporating the perspective of others affected by a choice or policy. This more
mutual type of decision-making and activism can help foster the use of
Plumwood’s ‘intentional recognition stance’ toward human and earth others,
which emphasizes that the needs and desires of others have ethical import.
‚Blue Vinyl‛ also sensitizes people to possible environmental dangers,
communicating them by juxtaposing everyday situations that are normally
incongruous to each other in order to defamiliarize important signals taken for
granted. For example, when Helfand goes to Louisiana to investigate the
manufacturing of one of the major chemical building blocks of vinyl, the film
shows images of a Mardi Gras celebration next to those of community chemical
plants expelling pollution into the atmosphere (Plevin 2004, 231). When an open
forum is held regarding the vinyl manufacturing, one of the members of the
Louisiana community who questions the corporation ‚demonstrates a beginning
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activism—speaking up for one’s convictions and doing it in a public place‛
(Plevin 2004, 232).
This ‚beginning activism‛ is reminiscent of the ‘power-to’ and ‘powerwith’ of feminist alternatives to power because it cuts through some of the
prevalent underlying social structures and norms that allow only those in power
to form judgments that will be heard, and to make decisions. Like the
‚beginning activist,‛ the movie encompasses artistic choices that inspire
activism. By creating a new awareness of the dangers of vinyl, an everyday item
usually outside of consideration, Helfand reinvigorates the audience’s sense of
reality, in a manner similar to the ostranenie of poetic invention. Plevin suggests
that Helfand’s actions illuminate the traits of ‚tenacity, even creativity‛, which
Plevin sees as intrinsic characteristics of activism (Plevin 2004, 233).
Plevin insightfully advances the connection between art and activism by
dubbing a significant element of activism: ‚the act of making hidden
connections visible‛ (Plevin 2004, 234). This idea resonates with the concepts of
‘seeing’, making the unconscious conscious, and defamiliarization that many
artistic practices encompass. It is through the use of ‚the provocative power of
humor,‛ in Helfand’s case, that she ultimately affects her audience (Plevin 2004,
231). By using the blue vinyl within the film as if it were a human character she is
able to place it in a surprising new light.
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By actually carrying a piece of the vinyl material with her, its presence
adds a new dimension to the responses inspired by her project. The way she
uses the material strongly impacts the responses of players in the film, as well as
those of the audience. For example, at one point, she has a meeting with some of
the manufacturers of the vinyl, and, in a humorous turn, they prevent her from
bringing the actual slab of it with her to the meeting due to their defensiveness
and strategizing. This act instantly highlights the dangers that the manufacturers
are attempting to hide.
The care ethics, ‚context-respectful approach,‛ that Helfand advances
forms connections between the subjects of the film in another sense (Held 1998,
99). Because the audience comes to understand the lack of safety of blue vinyl
through its deep impact on the lives of the individuals exposed to it, its level of
concern for those affected, as well as for these types of dangers, is raised. They
may even be compelled to activism by their new perspective since these
expressive aspects of the film effectively foster a new, more holistic awareness of
the ethical outcomes of the use of vinyl.
By engaging the audience with the question of safety through a personal,
engaged look at the consequences of the vinyl’s dangers, the film engenders
empathy and thoughtful responses (Plevin 2004, 227). Activism, therefore,
relates to artistic practices through its engaged mechanisms, its action118

orientation, and its concern. That is why the use of artistic practice as a means to
foster an ethical sense of care, is a natural basis for activism. Before I conclude
my work, I will briefly highlight three social movements that utilize art as
activism.
Native American Writing as Resistance
‚Whether our struggle is portrayed in a poem or a story, in a film or a television
show, or in visual art, we choose to struggle about how we conceptualize
ourselves. Images we create as a collective entity will either edge us toward
despair and apathy or unfold inside us and guide us toward the recovery of
ourselves and the living earth. We already see and feel these images of healing.
They wash over us like the waves, and we lend our energies to them because
they appeal to us from the core of what we are as human beings. With struggle,
we will create cultures that give people time to feel alive and to rest on the waves
of these creative energies.‛
(Hill 1998, 91)
As previously stated, Native American writing augments natural, landbased qualities through human creative interpretations and practices, thus
enhancing the human connection to the land by emphasizing what these authors
see as a language’s natural association with it. Several writers attempt to
synthesize nature and culture through the art of writing in an attempt to
rediscover a more cohesive, less marginalized sense of identity and community,
as well as to cultivate their interdependence with earth others. They play with
language, often developing hybrids of English and Native languages, in order to
infuse its style with a feeling of affinity for the land shared by many traditional
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Native American cultures. Native American author, Roberta J. Hill describes
how engaging in a constant creative struggle helps her realize how ‚a language
and the earth‛ relate to each other (Hill 1998, 73).
This struggle begins with her need to believe that language can
encompass her experiences. However, that which she strives to express, she
finds, exceeds the limits of a particular language in a manner similar to the way
that earth art elementals exceed the grasp of those experiencing them (Hill 1998,
73). Regardless of the struggle, Hill and others like her, view language as a
symbol and conduit for personal connections to particular lands. These lands
encompass history and community within their natural elements, generating
qualities that engender respect and care for the land. Through these connections,
a dialogue develops between nature and culture within these societies. As Hill
states, ‚*b+y singing and telling stories, we harmonize the inside of ourselves
with manifestations of the universe‛ (Hill 1998, 74). This struggle with language
forms the basis for actions that come to encompass forms of activism since it
actively engages Hill in the effort of re-envisioning key elements of life and of
developing moral ways to relate to others, including the environment.
For Jeannette Armstrong, the unwritten Okanagan language creates a very
different perception of reality than the one solicited by English, sometimes called
the enemy’s language because of the way it was forced on indigenous cultures
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(Armstrong 1998, 191). Her ancestors believed that land imparted language to
those living within it, and that the way languages developed occurred because of
the unique understanding corresponding to the uniqueness of the surrounding
geography (Armstrong 1998, 175-76). She asserts that her Okanagan language,
N’silxchn,
recreates sounds of the land in its utterance, but it also draws on the
natural human emotional response to sound and rhythm to contain and
express a philosophical or spiritual idea.
(Armstrong 1998, 188)
N’silxchn is embodied—expressed only through the human voice, and replete
with musical qualities arising from its use of the body (Armstrong 1998, 187-189).
Enhanced by a sense of anger at the effects of colonization on language
and land, Native Americans have become sensitized to injustices. These
sensitivities include an understanding of the ‚strong connections between the
marginalization of people and the degradation of the environment‛ (Adamson
2001, 109). Authors often express this perception through the style and subject
matter of their literature and culture in a way that functions as activism because
they take a stand through direct action and creative practice that attempts to
change the structures creating detrimental effects. For example, Gloria Bird
encourages testimonials by children and women about Native American
historical events in an attempt to use the practices of ‚witnessing and testimony‛
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to reveal personal responses to colonization in an attempt to foster perceptions
that support decolonization (Bird 1998, 29).
Hill, for her part, is most compelled by themes about human relation and
responsibility to the earth, the necessity of cultivating morality, reinvigorating
‘subjugated knowledges’, and the cultivation of community (Hill 1998, 74).
These themes find a voice through practices which encompass artistic ‘seeing’,
attentiveness, and openness to the earth other. In fact, since a ‚precise
geography‛ aids in producing the languages of indigenous peoples, the state of
the land strongly affects their cultural communities (Armstrong 1998, 178). An
understanding of this connection imbues much of their writing with awareness
of Western dualistic treatment of the environment and strategies for overcoming
detrimental effects to both perception and physical land.
Each author utilizes personal and tribal experiences and reiterates and
reinterprets them on new terms. For example, Armstrong tries to imbue English
language, when she utilizes it, with the movement and the rhythm of her native
Okanagan language. Authors consider their writing to work toward ‘survival’,
by fashioning identities that feel more authentic. Much of their writing resists
what Joni Adamson calls, ‚the official landscape,‛ ‚an extraction-oriented
landscape, imposed by government and corporation on local geographies
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without regard for local peoples, cultures, or environments‛ (Adamson 2001, 90,
109).
What Adamson calls ‚an ecological perspective‛ involves the
development of ‚a middle place between the local and the universal‛ where
connection is emphasized (Adamson 2001, 95). As Hill states, ‚*i+f we don’t
create, our cultures do not live. The need to create art and literature and music
keeps our ways alive and nourishes them. . . Our imaginative life is another
expression of the earth‛ (Hill 1998, 78). Their work remains tied to the earth,
even if they have been detached from their homelands. They even consider
themselves to ‚reinvent the enemy’s language,‛ the language forced on them
through colonization (Armstrong 1998, 175). Inherent in the reinvention of
language and the connection to the earth is a need for action and a realization of
identity springing from the struggle. Toward this reinvention, Native authors
create new ways of relating, such as Adamson’s ‘middle place’, that break down
negative dualistic patterns through cultural practices and the act of writing.

Tikkun Olam and Jewish American Painters: Healing the World, Ben Shahn
Another brand of activism comes from artistic practices of twentieth
century Jewish American painters based on tikkun olam, a centuries old Jewish
tradition of ‚repairing the world; leaving it a better place than it was when one
was born into it‛ (Soltes 2003, 39). In his book, Fixing the World: Jewish
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American Painters in the Twentieth Century, Ori Z. Soltes states that an ‚interest
in the social, and not merely aesthetic, import of art‛ is ‚present to a pronounced
degree among Jewish American artists‛ (Soltes 2003, ix). The works that Soltes
presents range in subject matter from socialism to the sublime, and include
elements of individual identity and the universal. While the styles utilized are
wide ranging, and include representational, conceptual, abstract, chromatic
expressionist, and abstract expressionist art, regardless of the approach utilized,
their creators imbue and intertwine an ethical perspective within them.
One formidable example is that of Jewish American Realist/Magic Realist
painter, Ben Shahn, now well-known as an American protest painter. In
describing what compels him to communicate through art, Shahn stated, ‚I hate
injustice. . . I guess it’s about the only thing I really do hate‛ (Soltes 2003, 39).
Utilizing irony, emphasized through exaggeration of angles and the physical
attributes of subjects, and a ‚poster-like flattening of perspective‛ in his
paintings, Shahn created artworks that question the continuity between self and
world and suggest a curiosity and questioning of ethical perspectives through
their subject matter and style.
The painting, ‚Identity,‛ shows ‚five pairs of clenched fists. . . raised
like Ten Commandments heavenward‛ (Soltes 2003, 43-44). The hands gesture
toward the Hebrew quotation: ‘‛If I am not for myself, who will be for me? But
124

if I am only for myself, what am I?‛’ (Soltes 2003, 42). Shahn saw this question
‚as a statement of his own identity, as individual, family man, member of a
community and citizen of the United States, Jew and member of the human race‛
(Soltes 2003, 42). This question appears to examine the very essence of ethical
intersubjectivity and relationships, which, for Shahn, seem to have been of
fundamental importance. This stance often brought images and subjects into his
artistic vocabulary, due to his aspiration to relate his own experience and view of
contemporary issues to his artistic expression (Pohl 1993, 11).
Shahn was personally engaged in many issues of his day. He was a
liberal, New Deal artist who utilized his art to support trade unions, Franklin
Roosevelt’s stand for full employment after the Second World War, and
international human rights, to name a few causes. For instance, he questioned
the outcome of the now infamous trial of two men convicted of murder, Sacco
and Vanzetti, after groups protested the convictions alleging ‚racial and political
bias‛ (Pohl 1989, 45). He created a series of stylized portraits of the two men.
One of the memorable tableaus shows them in handcuffs in the courtroom, and
another, portrays them lying in their caskets with the Lowell Committee, which
had reviewed the court findings, standing over them with sour expressions.
Compelled to action by the case, Shahn stated,
‚I’d wished that I’d been lucky enough to be alive at a great time—when
something big was going on, like the Crucifixion. And suddenly I
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realized I was! Here I was living through another crucifixion. Here was
something to paint!‛
(Pohl 1993, 12)
Clearly, for Shahn, artistic expression was an activist gesture—a practice in
which he could reveal his support or opposition of contentious issues in a direct
way.
His poster, ‚This is Nazi Brutality‛ from 1942, uses the exact wording of
part of the German announcement of the destruction of the Czechoslovakian
village of Lidice, in which most of the inhabitants were shot or taken to
internment camps (Pohl, 1989). The words are laid over an anonymous, darkly
clothed individual with a hood, who stands handcuffed in the corner of a brick
enclosure. The bag over the prisoner’s head reaches toward an ominous sky
above. The words, ‚This is Nazi brutality,‛ run across the man’s chest. It is a
simple presentation, yet bold, one that stimulates a visceral response and a sense
of empathy for the individual, who is completely covered except for his
clenched, handcuffed fists. Shahn’s understanding of the injustice of this
brutality translates to the viewer of the poster, at least inspiring empathy, at most
calling for action.
Shahn, primarily known as a painter, also became interested in
photography as a way to engage in an unpretentious way with his subjects. His
photographic style helped him to avoid the ‚artificiality of posed studio models‛
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and to develop ‘‛art of and for the people,‛ an imagery that would literally come
from the streets and be translated into murals that would, in turn, speak to a
broad audience’ (Pohl 1993, 15). He was employed in Theodore Roosevelt’s
Federal Art Project, part of the Works Progress Administration. The Farm
Security Administration branch employed him to document U.S. economic
conditions. This project produced moving visual evidence that the
administration used to implement support programs for those in economic need
(Pohl 1993, 16). Shahn states that he and the photographers he worked with
‚had only one purpose—a moral one I suppose. So we decided: no angle
shots, no filters, no mats, nothing glossy but paper. . . Nobody had even
done it before, deliberately. . . We just took pictures that cried out to be
taken.‛
(Pohl 1993, 16)
These works may or may not have affected American culture through an
‘everyday’ individual’s viewing of and response to them. They certainly did
function as activism by affecting the public at large through the awareness of
injustice that they fostered within certain powerful individuals, as well as
through the effects of the programs, like those using Shahn’s and other
photographers’ visual evidence to help those in economic need. It is also clear
that by practicing his art, Shahn shaped and transformed, at very least, molded
his experiences and his perspective and view toward others. He created an everevolving personal outlook on the world. He also contributed to society as part of
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a group of artists within a way of life that formed a basis for reflection on
intersubjective relationships and activism intended to help raise awareness and
help those in need.
Folk Music and the Civil Rights Movement
My final example of artistic practice and activism is that of the connection
between folk music and the American Civil Rights movement. In Musicking:
The Meanings of Performing and Listening, Christopher Small states, ‚*f+or
living creatures. . . the most important information they receive from the
outside world concerns relationships‛ (Small 1998, 57). This claim echoes
Russon’s perspective, previously stated, that it is through physically relating to
other elements in the world that people begin develop an understanding of the
world. Like my claims regarding actively engaging in artistic practices, Small’s
book asserts the importance of perceiving music as an active practice, ‚a music
act,‛ that people use to engage with others and world, rather than a static object
(Small 1998, 8).
Small emphasizes the mind/body components of making music, and
introduces the word ‚musicking‛ in order to place an emphasis on music as
action—one that groups do together—rather than product (Small 1998, 9-10).
Though music is considered more abstract than other forms of art, feeling music
in a bodily way comes from the relationships between the elements within it, the
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resonating sound waves, notes, rhythm, and melody. Furthermore, music is
deeply affective, and sound is an entity that is experienced individually and
communally in concurrence, it therefore, reveals the ability to engage an
individual holistically through intellect, affect, and body, as well as drawing
groups of people together through shared experiences.
Perhaps these are some of the reasons that music became a partner in the
American Civil Rights movement. As Guy and Candie Carawan state in Sing for
Freedom: The Story of the Civil Rights Movement Through Its Songs, ‚The civil
rights movement without its music would have been like a bird without its
wings‛ (Carawan 2008, xiii). Singing is bodily, and inherently expressive. Songs
contain thoughts, but also generate physical sensations of sound and emotional
effects on listeners. The civil rights music is a dramatic example of the holistic
ethical transformational nature of art. At first, those within the rights movement
did not realize the vital necessity for ‚dynamic music‛ within the movement
(Carawan 2008, xviii). Soon, it became a force that bonded people within the
movement together, providing inspiration, solace, and a means of expression,
and garnering empathy from those outside of the movement.
Clearly, a means of forging positive intersubjective ethical relationships,
the ‚powerful singing. . . became such an integral part of the struggle‛
(Carawan 2008, xxii). Both the movement and the music ‚evolved step by step,
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creatively, as ordinary people in grassroots communities recognized problems
and came together to confront them‛ (Carawan 2008, xxii). These songs brought
a variety of people together in the pursuit of justice and, today, especially, with
their meanings intensified through their social history, they continue to rouse
people to action. From striking Appalachian miners to Chinese democracy
campaigners to many other marginalized and subordinated groups, these songs
continue to evoke powerful effects on the mental, emotional, physical, and
communal nature of those who engage with them, and to spur the direct action
of activism in support of their causes (Carawan 2008, xvii).
Conclusion
My purpose in writing about art and ethics comes from my deep love and
involvement with the arts, in which I have noticed that those sincerely engaged
in these practices tend toward more aware and relational ways of being. By
utilizing a more holistic approach for interacting with other entities, I believe that
human beings can foster more positive ethical relationships. By fully engaging
the mind/heart, one can refine one’s senses, order creative expression, and
connect with others in a way that honors their differences and, through a deeper
sense of empathy, attempts to see and feel the interdependence of the other, as
well as what is needed for its thriving.
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In this way, one avoids dualistic conceptual habits in which others are
seen as undeserving of moral concern, or reduced as means to another’s ends.
Furthermore, at least some positive elements related to embodied artistic
practices can be distilled into other activities. By taking time, learning to look
and to relate to others, an individual can develop some of these attitudes. Even
developing the habit of taking walks in order to begin to observe the play of
elementals, the activity of animals, and the positive and negative changes in the
environment, one can begin to foster a long-standing relationship with others.
These actions bring engagement and the seeds of change. Perhaps they
could even lead to more types of embodied, and possibly artistic, expressions
that foster a deeper change in the individual, as well as that affect others.
Furthermore, because art functions to open other’s minds through feeling—it can
create what Friedrich Schiller called, a ‚common sense,‛ in which humanity
finds a more holistic type of harmony than one that is merely political (Schiller
2004, 139). Beauty’s possession of the power to inspire, may even, at its best,
inspire epiphanies that can heal cultural wounds, relieve discord between
aggressors, and with some providence, bring about a new sense of respect for
earth others.
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